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REFORMING THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION: AN ESSAY
ON DETERRENCE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Securities class actions impose enormous penalties, but they achieve little
compensation and only limited deterrence. This is because of a basic circu-
larity underlying the securities class action: When damages are imposed on
the corporation, they essentially fall on diversified shareholders, thereby pro-
ducing mainly pocket-shifting wealth transfers among shareholders. The
current equilibrium benefits corporate insiders, insurers, and plaintiffs' at-
torneys, but not investors. The appropriate answer to this problem is not to
abandon securities litigation, but to shift the incidence of its penalties so
that, in the secondary market context, they fall less on the corporation and
more on those actors who are truly culpable. This Essay proposes a variety of
means to this end involving the settlement process, insurance, and attorneys'
fees.
INTRODUCTION
Critics of the securities class action have advanced virtually every con-
ceivable critique-except the most telling. The standard criticism from
the business community, the corporate bar, and some academics has long
been that securities class actions disproportionately assert "frivolous"
claims and thereby reduce shareholder welfare on average.' A related
theme has been that securities class actions systematically overcompen-
sate, yielding damages that exceed the societal harm, and therefore
should be limited by some form of ceiling on damages.2 Courts also have
* John C. Coffee, Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University
School of Law and Director of its Center on Corporate Governance.
1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) was clearly a product
of this sense that securities class actions were disproportionately nonmeritorious. See Pub.
L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18
U.S.C.). In enacting the PSLRA, Congress announced this view explicitly, stating in the
legislative history that among the PSLRA's purposes was the desire to end the "routine
filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant
change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer,
and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action." H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730. This view that securities class actions were often frivolous was nurtured in part by
academic research, much of it still controversial. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud
in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 903, 979 (1996) ("[E]mpirical results show that most securities-fraud class actions are,
in fact, frivolous."); StephenJ. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 Vand. L.
Rev. 1465, 1477-98 (2004) [hereinafter Choi, Evidence] (reviewing prior studies
suggesting securities class actions were frequently or normally nonmeritorious).
2. The most recent and unrelentingly critical attack has been sponsored by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. See, e.g., Anjan V. Thakor with Jeffrey S. Nielsen & David A.
Gulley, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, The Economic Reality of Securities Class
Action Litigation 5 (2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/pdfs/
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expressed similar doubts, and this Term the Supreme Court has again
noted the unique "vexatiousness" of securities litigation.3 In contrast, the
plaintiffs' bar (and some academics) protest that the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) has crippled the securities class
action and denied it the ability to reach important types of securities
fraud, such as fraudulent forward-looking statements. 4 All this rhetoric,
however, misses the fundamental problem: As presently constituted, se-
EconomicRealityNavigant.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Thakor,
Economic Reality] (arguing that large institutional investors are overcompensated as a
result of securities litigation); Anjan V. Thakor, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, The
Unintended Consequences of Securities Litigation 14 (2005), available at http://www.
instituteforlegalreform.com/pdfs/UnintendedConsequencesThakor.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (stating that information-related disclosure litigation "destroys on
average approximately 3.5% of the equity value of a company" with result that "at least
$24.7 billion in shareholder wealth was wiped out just due to litigation"); see also Donald
C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 639,
646 (1996) (arguing that there will be "systematic overcompensation" from securities fraud
litigation if full compensation becomes goal of securities litigation). This line of argument
about excessive damages originates with Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 611, 639-40 (1985), which argued
that because for every investor who lost money in a secondary market case, another
investor profited, the social harm could not be defined as the sum of all investor losses.
Accordingly, they argued that attempts to compensate such losses fully would yield
systematically excessive damages. Id.
3. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1510
(2006) (arguing that securities litigation presents "danger of vexatiousness different in
degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general" (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739
(1975))). To the extent that courts doubt the legitimacy of securities litigation and see
little valid purpose being served, this refrain will predictably be repeated. This Essay seeks,
however, to ground securities litigation on a stronger rationale.
4. For the strongest recent defense of the securities class action, which defends it on
both deterrent and compensatory grounds, see James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud
Class Actions Virtuous, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 497, 509-15 (1997). For an earlier defense written
at the time of the passage of the PSLRA suggesting that the premises underlying the
PSLRA were unfounded, see Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A
Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438, 439 (1994).
Other academic articles have raised the narrower argument that the PSLRA may chill
meritorious actions at least as much as it chills "frivolous" ones. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale,
Heightened Pleadings and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA's
Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 537, 562-65
(1998); Lynn A. Stout, Commentary, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 711, 714-15 (1996). Professor Stephen J. Choi,
long a critic of "frivolous" securities litigation, has also noted that the PSLRA may chill
meritorious claims that lack hard evidence of fraud. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter
Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act? 22-27 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Res.
Paper Series, Paper No. 03-04, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=
558285 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For the plaintiffs' bar's view of recent
developments in the securities class action, see, e.g., PatrickJ. Coughlin, Eric Alan Isaacson
& Joseph D. Daley, What's Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs' Attorneys Review the
Supreme Court's Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 37 Loy. U. Chi.
L.J. 1, 31-41 (2005).
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curities class actions produce wealth transfers among shareholders that
neither compensate nor deter.
This Essay is equally skeptical of those who claim that securities litiga-
tion is vexatious and frivolous and those who claim that it has been seri-
ously chilled.5 Its basic diagnosis views compensation as unobtainable
and deterrence as deeply compromised by a variety of inconsistent legal
doctrines that pull the punch of private enforcement. Deterrence, it will
be argued, is the only rationale that canjustify the significant costs-both
public and private-that securities class actions impose on investors and
the judiciary. Potentially, securities class actions could fulfill their deter-
rent promise. Indeed, private securities class actions currently represent
the principal means by which financial penalties are imposed in cases of
securities fraud and manipulation. In the aggregate, they impose penal-
ties that overshadow those imposed by federal and state authorities and
by self-regulatory organizations. 6 Moreover, the total amount of damages
awarded in securities class actions has soared in recent years.
7
But do these massive penalties achieve much of value-let alone ap-
proach optimal deterrence? Not necessarily. Deterrence works best
when it is focused on the culpable, but there is little evidence that securi-
ties class actions today satisfy this standard. Rather, because the costs of
securities class actions-both the settlement payments and the litigation
expenses of both sides-fall largely on the defendant corporation, its
shareholders ultimately bear these costs indirectly and often inequitably.
5. The true "strike suit" nuisance action, filed only because it was too expensive to
defend, is, in this author's judgment, a beast like the unicorn, more discussed than directly
observed. Although small settlements may have been impelled in part by the high cost of
defense, the corresponding observation is that the small damages in these cases also did
not justify much effort on the plaintiffs side. Neither side wanted to invest much effort in
them-but this does not make them inherently frivolous. Similarly, the economic
evidence that strike suits predominate also seems unpersuasive. A series of event studies
have sought to demonstrate that securities class actions are frivolous based on the positive
stock price reaction to political developments seeking to curtail such litigation. Compare
D. Katherine Spiess & Paula A. Tkac, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
The Stock Market Casts Its Vote ... , 18 Managerial & Decision Econ. 545, 553-55 (1997)
(analyzing market impact of PSLRA presidential veto threat and of subsequent
congressional veto override), and Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K. Nelson,
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5 Rev.
Acct. Stud. 217, 226-29 (2000) (same, using different industry sample), with Choi,
Evidence, supra note 1, at 1477-83 (analyzing these two studies). Although these studies
focused on the shareholder wealth effects of the PSLRA, they do not measure whether
such litigation was frivolous, but only that it ultimately imposed costs on shareholders.
This negative market reaction seems more fairly attributed to what this Essay will term the
"circularity problem"-namely, that the costs of the action fall principally on innocent
shareholders.
6. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
7. In 2005, corporations paid a record $9.6 billion in securities class action
settlements, as compared with $2.9 billion in 2004. This $9.6 billion does not include the
$7.1 billion partial settlement in the Enron litigation, which remains to be judicially
approved. Paul Davies, Class-Action Pay Settlements Soar, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 2006, at C3.
1536
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION REFORM
This year, the Securities and Exchange Commission itself recognized this
point in the related context of financial penalties, formally acknowledg-
ing in a statement of its intended future policy that large financial penal-
ties should be avoided when they will fall inequitably on innocent share-
holders.8 The Commission indicated that its future policy, at least in
cases where the corporation did not directly benefit from the violation,
would be "to seek penalties from culpable individual offenders." 9 By the
same logic, imposing the full cost of securities class actions on sharehold-
ers can be at least as inequitable. In the typical secondary market case,
the corporation is not selling its securities and thus does not receive any
"direct benefit" (in the Commission's phrase) when its managers inflate
its earnings and stock price (usually for their own benefit). To punish
the corporation and its shareholders in such a case is much like seeking
to deter burglary by imposing penalties on the victim for having suffered
a burglary. Although such an approach might arguably encourage addi-
tional precautions, it will also encounter predictable resistance from
those it is ostensibly seeking to protect.
This explanation, that the burden of securities legislation falls per-
versely on the victim, also better explains those stock price event studies
that report that the subject company's stock price typically falls when a
securities class action is filed and that stock prices generally rise when
legislation is passed curtailing securities class actions.1 0 These studies are
often cited as proof that such litigation is frivolous, but they show no such
thing. Rather, whether the action is meritorious or frivolous, the costs of
such litigation fall on innocent shareholders, not the responsible parties.
As a result, the market reacts adversely to the filing of the action because
it expects that the eventual settlement of the action will be borne by the
shareholders as a group.
8. On January 4, 2006, the SEC issued this formal statement of future policy regarding
financial penalties by the unusual means of a press release, which stated that exemplary
penalties should be visited upon the corporate issuer only in special cases:
[A] key question for the Commission is whether the issuer's violation has
provided an improper benefit to shareholders, or conversely whether the
violation has resulted in harm to the shareholders. Where shareholders have
been victimized by the violative conduct, or by the resulting negative effect on the
entity following its discovery, the Commission is expected to seek penalties from
culpable individual offenders acting for a corporation.
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), at http://www.sec.gov./news/
press/2006-4.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Commission then added
that two principles would guide it in the future imposing penalties on a corporation:
(1) "The presence or absence of a direct benefit to the corporation as a result of
the violation;" and
(2) "The degree to which the penalty will recompense or further harm the
injured shareholders."
Id. This Essay submits that these same policies logically apply and should be consistently
followed in designing the securities class action as a tool of private enforcement.
9. Id.
10. See studies discussed supra note 5.
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So what should be done? Unlike those authors who have called for
ceilings on liability or the transformation of the securities class action
into a form of civil penalty,"1 this Essay maintains that the goal of deter-
rence requires the imposition of significant financial damages, but argues
that, to the extent possible, the incidence of such damages should be
shifted so that they fall more on the culpable (and less on the innocent).
To be sure, any such reallocation can be only marginal, but even a mod-
est change could be sufficient to deter.
Obvious as the goal of imposing penalties on the culpable may seem,
it is easier said than done. Practical difficulties abound, which this Essay
will address in four stages. Part I will begin with some basic public policy
cost accounting that is intended to place the securities class action in con-
text as the principal enforcement mechanism for policing the equity capi-
tal markets. Part II will then turn to the central problem: Securities class
actions essentially impose costs on public shareholders in order to com-
pensate public shareholders. This is a circular process whose perverse
effects are compounded by the twin facts that (a) public shareholders
tend to be diversified (and thus are on both sides of the wealth transfer),
and (b) on each such transfer a significant percentage of the transfer
payment goes to lawyers and other agents. Those who defend this system
proclaim that it is no different from the system of entity liability that tort
law scholarship has long endorsed, but Part II will draw some basic dis-
tinctions. Unlike most tort litigation, which seeks to force shareholders
to bear the costs that their corporation imposes on others, securities liti-
gation imposes costs on investors because of harm done to investors-
without recognizing that the victim is again bearing the costs of its own
injury. Equally important, the corporation may not be the best "cost
avoider" of financial fraud that is engaged in primarily to benefit corpo-
rate managers (a category into which most securities fraud, it will be ar-
gued, falls). Part III will then assess why the losses suffered by injured
investors today are seldom imposed on the responsible officers and
agents of the corporation whose misbehavior caused those losses. Then,
it will explore the practical problems, including insurance and indemnifi-
cation, that interfere with achieving such an allocation. Finally, Part IV
will propose some practical remedies toward such a reallocation.
I. PLACING THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION IN CONTEXT
From a policy perspective, the securities class action has two poten-
tial rationales: compensation and deterrence. This section will explain
the shortcomings of each rationale as measured against the current real-
ity. Before examining either rationale, however, it is useful to understand
the significant costs that securities class actions impose on both the judici-
ary and shareholders.
11. See sources cited supra note 2.
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A. The Public Role of the Securities Class Action
The first myth to dispel is that securities class actions are simply one
of many varieties of class action, no different in principle from antitrust
or civil rights class actions. In fact, as the following data from the Admin-
istrative Office of the U.S. Courts reveal, securities class actions are
unique at least from a quantitative perspective. In effect, they are the
800-pound gorilla that dominates and overshadows other forms of class
actions:
TABLE 1: TOTAL CLASS ACTIONS PENDING IN FEDERAL COURTS AS OF
SEPTEMBER 30, 2002, 2003, AND 200412
Type of Case 2002 2003 2004
Contract 282 290 289
Real Property 33 38 34
Tort Actions 529 604 600
Antitrust 249 231 202
Employment Rights 164 159 173
Other Civil Rights 298 274 266
Prisons, Prisoners 66 64 82
RICO 53 76 46
ERISA 134 183 216
Other Labor Suits 180 204 262
Securities/Commodities/Exchange 2325 2339 2480
Others 522 515 529
Total 4835 4977 5179
Securities Class Actions as a Percentage of Total 47.5% 47% 47.9%
12. These data are taken from Table X4 to the annualJudicial Business of the United
States Courts reports for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. See Admin. Office of
the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 395-97 tbl.X-4 (2002),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/x04sep02.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 2002 Annual Report]; Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 393-97 tbl.X-4 (2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendices/x4.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter 2003 Annual Report]; Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial
Business of the United States Courts 400-03 tbl.X-4 (2004), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/x4.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter 2004 Annual Report]. It must be acknowledged that these statistics may
overstate the judicial burden of securities class actions for two reasons: First, most
securities class actions are consolidated for purposes of discovery by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000). Also, few class actions are ever
tried. Still, even cases consolidated under this provision must be remanded back to the
original district court at the conclusion of the pretrial proceedings. See Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34-40 (1998). Hence, it seems
legitimate to count individual class actions. Second, in 2005 and 2006, there has been a
marked decline in the number of new filings of securities class actions. See Paul Davies,
Class Inaction: Plaintiffs' Lawsuits Against Companies Sharply Decline, Wall St. J., Aug. 26,
2006, at Al [hereinafter Davies, Class Inaction] (noting 45% decline in securities class
action filings in first half of 2006). This is a brief period, and thus it is premature to reach
judgments about whether this decline will persist.
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Because securities class actions have averaged between 47% and 48%
of all class actions pending in federal court, they necessarily consume sig-
nificantjudicial resources. Viewed in this light, securities class actions are
essentially subsidized by the U.S. taxpayer, and thus, they raise the ques-
tion of whether society is receiving an adequate return on its investment.
Beyond the sheer weight of their numbers, securities class actions
disproportionately claim judicial time and attention for several additional
reasons. First, they take longer to resolve than most other class actions, I3
and this tendency is increasing. 14 Second, they require the court to play
a more active monitoring role. Under the unique provisions of the
PSLRA, the court must select the "lead plaintiff' who will represent the
class. Initially, this requires the court to determine which potential plain-
tiff suffered the largest losses and thus has the greatest stake in the action.
Recent experience has shown that competition often arises for the posi-
tion of lead plaintiff, and administering these disputes, which are essen-
tially contests among competing teams of plaintiffs' attorneys, consumes
significant judicial time. 15 Third, the plaintiff in a securities class action
is disadvantaged in comparison to plaintiffs in other forms of class actions
in that it cannot obtain discovery until the plaintiff has first satisfied a
13. During fiscal years ending September 30, 2002, 2003, and 2004, securities class
actions constituted 42.4%, 33.5%, and 38.7%, respectively, of all class actions filed during
those years, but amounted to 47.5%, 47%, and 47.9% of all class actions pending on
September 30, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Thus, although the percentage commenced went
down, the percentage pending stayed relatively constant, showing that securities class
actions have a longer duration. Compare Table X-5 (showing actions commenced during
the twelve-month period ending September 30 of each year) with Table X-4 (showing cases
pending on September 30 of each year) of the annual Judicial Business of the United
States Courts reports for 2002, 2003, and 2004. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 12, at
395-400 tbls.X-4 & X-5; 2003 Annual Report, supra note 12, at 393-400 tbls.X-4 & X-5;
2004 Annual Report, supra note 12, at 400-07 tbls.X-4 & X-5.
14. One study finds that the percentage of securities class actions settling within four
years of the action's filing dropped from 57.59% pre-PSLRA to only 26.06% after the
PSLRA. Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon C. Mazumdar & Atulya Sain, Securities Class Action
Settlements, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1001, 1010 (2003). Slower settlement rates may imply a
lower rate of frivolous actions, as these authors surmise, but they also suggest an increased
judicial burden.
15. For representative cases showing the issues that emerge, see, e.g., In re Cendant
Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 197-99 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that once lead plaintiff is
appointed, primary responsibility for compensation shifts to lead plaintiff, and its decisions
are entitled to presumption of correctness); In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that shareholders with largest financial stake, not shareholders with most
advantageous fee arrangements with lawyers, were presumptively most capable lead
plaintiffs under PSLRA); In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 355 F. Supp. 2d 261, 263-64 (D.D.C.
2005) (holding that investor sustaining largest loss was "prima facie" lead plaintiff and was
not disqualified due to having lead plaintiff status in too many other suits). Many (but not
all) courts now use a "last-in, first-out" ("lifo") accounting method to calculate the lead
plaintiff's losses and reject a "first-in, first-out" ("fifo") accounting method. See In re
eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC,
Sec. Litig., 217 F.R.D. 372, 378-79 (E.D. Va. 2003). But, symptomatically, this point
continues to be litigated.
1540 [Vol. 106:1534
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heightened pleading test that normally requires it to plead, with particu-
larity, facts giving rise to a strong inference of fraud.16 Often, this process
will involve multiple motions in which the parties contest whether this
heightened pleading standard has been satisfied (with the plaintiffs typi-
cally receiving at least one leave to replead their complaint if their initial
pleadings fail this test). Discovery disputes are also common, in large
part because the plaintiff may be seeking to take the deposition of senior
corporate officials, directors, and agents, who would all have their own
counsel, who predictably will object that their time is being wasted.
Finally, the settlement process in securities class actions has become
more complicated, as a growing number of sophisticated class members
may decide to opt out of the class or may object to the settlement's fair-
ness or the reasonableness of the attorney's fees.' 7 Although this could
also happen in other types of class actions, the increasingly predominant
role of institutional investors among U.S. shareholders implies that the
class in a securities class action will include many sophisticated and well-
informed members who will make their own decisions and will often con-
test class counsel's decisions. The bottom line then is that a greater bur-
den is placed on the court by a securities class action, and this burden
tends to be concentrated in a few federal Courts of Appeals-most nota-
bly the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit-where these cases tend to
cluster disproportionately.'
8
16. Section 21D(b) (3) (B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 stays discovery
during the pendency of any motion by a defendant challenging the adequacy of the
pleadings. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (2000). This produces something of a "Catch-22"
problem for the plaintiff: Namely, the plaintiff cannot obtain discovery until the plaintiff
has adequately pled a particularized complaint, but to plead such a complaint plaintiffs
traditionally rely on discovery.
17. In the past, class action plaintiffs' attorneys competed to be named class counsel.
Today, however, the choice of class counsel is only the first round in their competition.
The unsuccessful competitor may then seek to induce institutional investors in the class to
opt out" and sue with this firm as their counsel in state court. William Lerach, probably
the best known plaintiffs attorney in the securities field, has recently utilized this strategy,
inducing a large number of funds to opt out of both the WorldCom settlement and the
more recent AOL Time Warner settlement. See Lorraine Woellert, Fractured Class
Actions: "Opt-Outs" Are a Growing Headache for Companies, Bus. Wk., Feb. 27, 2006, at
31, 31. Opt-outs force the defendant to fight a two-front war and increase the uncertainty
about the ultimate cost of settlement. Also, as seen by the recent example of the
WorldCom litigation, litigation can arise between the federal and state actions when the
federal court seeks to stay the state action. See Ret. Sys. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386
F.3d 419, 431 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding federal trial court injunction ordering stay of state
court proceedings unauthorized by All Writs Act and Anti-Injunction Act).
18. The Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have long been the principal circuits in
which securities class actions are filed. In 2005, when the number of securities class actions
fell to 176, forty-four were filed in the Second Circuit, thirty-eight in the Ninth Circuit, and
only eighteen in the Third Circuit, which had the next highest number. See Stephen
Taub, Securities-Fraud Lawsuits Decline, CFO.com, Jan. 3, 2006, at http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/5353420?f=search (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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The public policy significance of securities class actions becomes
even clearer when we turn from the cost to the benefit side of the ledger.
Professor Howell Jackson has recently estimated the total effort made to
enforce the securities laws in the United States and several other major
jurisdictions. 19 Although his focus was on the relative "regulatory inten-
sity" of these various jurisdictions, he found that the majority of the total
monetary sanctions recently imposed in the United States were obtained
through private, not public, enforcement. Looking at the years 2000 to
2002, he estimated the average annual financial sanctions imposed over
these three years to break down as follows:
TABLE 2: AVERAGE PAYMENTS 2000-200220
Public Monetary Sanctions Private Monetary Sanctions
SEC Monetary Sanctions: $801,333,333 Class Action Settlements: $1,906,333,333
State Monetary Sanctions: $931,212,489 Class Action Trial Awards: $17,626,000
NASD Disciplinary Sanctions: $126,110,622 NASD Arbitration Awards: $104,000,000
NYSE Disciplinary Sanctions: $5,752,833 NYSE Arbitration Awards: (not available)
Total: $1,864,409,277 Total: $2,027,959,333
The statistic that virtually leaps out from this data is that securities
class action settlements averaged an annual aggregate amount (i.e.,
$1,906,333,333) exceeding the sum of all public monetary sanctions. To
be sure, the federal securities laws are also enforced by criminal penalties
(chiefly, incarceration) and by SEC suspensions, expulsions, cease and
desist orders, and other nonmonetary relief. Nonetheless, plaintiffs' at-
torneys appear to extract more funds from corporate pocketbooks than
do all federal and state regulators.
Another way to understand the significant role played by private en-
forcement is to focus on individual cases and contrast the penalties im-
posed on corporate defendants by public and private enforcers.
Cornerstone Research has prepared an illustrative table that contrasts the
relative size of SEC and private settlements in recent notable cases:
2 1
19. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications 15-29 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin
Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 521, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=839250 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
20. Id. at 27.
21. See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Post-Reform Act
Securities Settlements: 2005 Review and Analysis 13 (2005), available at http://securities.
cornerstone.com/pdfs/settlements_2005.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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TABLE 3: PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)
Settlement Fund
Settlement Fund in Related Class
Case in SEC Action Action
WorldCom, Inc. $750.0 $6,156.1
Computer Associates International, Inc. $225.0 $128.6
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company $150.0 $300.0
Symbol Technologies $37.0 $102.0
Lucent Technologies, Inc. $25.0 $517.2
i2 Technologies, Inc. $10.0 $87.8
Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc. $10.0 $92.5
Homestore, Inc. $5.0 $78.0
Measurement Specialties, Inc. $1.5 $8.1
Clearly, even in major scandals where the SEC has brought its own
action, the damages paid in securities class actions are usually (but not
always) a multiple of those paid to the SEC.
That private enforcement seems to dwarf public enforcement does
not mean, however, that the securities class action generates an adequate
deterrent threat. Several basic limitations need to be understood.
First, research suggests that there are some categories of companies
and fraud that are largely beyond the reach of securities class actions.
22
Because the plaintiffs attorney must advance the expenses of the class
action and will not be reimbursed if the action is unsuccessful, the plain-
tiffs attorney must estimate in advance the expected fee award, discount-
ing it both for the prospect of a loss and for the time value of money over
the period until payment is made, in order to determine if the action
justifies the risks being undertaken. Because the fee award tends to be a
function of the recovery, this, in turn, implies that a small recovery will
mean at best a small fee award. As a result, the conventional wisdom has
long been that companies with small market capitalizations are less likely
to be sued in securities class actions. 2 3 Where this arguable threshold of
immunity begins has long been the subject of debate. Using data from
the early 1980s, Professor Janet Alexander found that all the initial public
offerings (IPOs) in her sample with market losses over $20 million elic-
ited a class action, while none of the IPOs with losses under that amount
resulted in litigation.2 4 Another study, examining the period from 1975
to 1986, found that less than 1% of IPOs with an offering amount of less
than $5 million resulted in a securities class action. 25 These authors con-
cluded that "smaller sized offerings hardly ever experience a securities-
fraud suit.
26
22. See sources cited infra notes 24-28.
23. See Choi, Evidence, supra note 1, at 1473-74, 1480-81.
24. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 511-13 (1991) [hereinafter Alexander,
Merits].
25. See Bohn & Choi, supra note 1, at 926-37.
26. Id. at 936.
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Ultimately, the threshold below which a corporation becomes seem-
ingly exempt from securities class actions as a "smaller sized" company
depends upon the costs (and risks) of bringing a securities class action.
Again, the conventional wisdom is that the passage of the PSLRA has
driven these costs up and thus raised the threshold at which a securities
class action can be justified by the expected fee award to the plaintiffs
attorney.27 For present purposes, it is unnecessary to locate where this
zone of immunity begins, 28 but only to recognize that there is a cutoff
level in terms of market capitalization below which private enforcement
appears not to work.
29
Similarly, there may also be species of fraud for which private en-
forcement no longer works well. Several researchers have reported a shift
in the type of claim litigated in the post-PSLRA time period, with allega-
tions of accounting irregularities becoming the predominant claim in
class actions filed after the passage of the PSLRA and allegations of false
forward-looking statements declining as a percentage. 30 In addition,
cases involving accounting allegations and restatements appear to have a
higher settlement value than cases lacking these factors. 3 1 The PSLRA's
"safe harbor" for forward-looking statements is the most likely (but not
the exclusive) cause of this transition because it requires the plaintiff to
27. Corroborating this view, Professors Grundfest and Perino found an increase in the
average stock price decline experienced by corporations that were sued after the effective
date of the PSLRA, suggesting that PSLRA raised the threshold at which a securities class
action became cost justified to plaintiffs' attorneys. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A.
Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience 971-72 (1997), at
Westlaw, 1015 PLI/Corp 955 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Grundfest and Perino
did not, however, find an increase in the market capitalization of the typical post-PSLRA
defendant, which actually declined. Id. at 969. Their explanation was that large market
capitalization firms experienced a lower rate of accounting irregularities. Id. at 970.
28. Professor Alexander hypothesized that a minimum of $20 million in damages was
necessary to make the class action economically attractive to plaintiffs' attorneys. In IPOs
with market losses above $20 million, all defendants in her sample were sued; below that
level, none were sued. See Alexander, Merits, supra note 24, at 511-13.
29. Grundfest and Perino estimated that the mean market capitalization of a post-
PSLRA defendant was $529.3 million. Grnndfest & Perino, supra note 27, at 969.
30. See, e.g., Bajaj, Mazumdar & Sarin, supra note 14, at 1006-07; Grundfest &
Perino, supra note 27, at 973-74; cf. Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K. Nelson,
The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking
Information by High Technology Firms, 39 J. Acct. Res. 297, 312-18 (2001) (noting
increase in voluntary forward-looking disclosures after PSLRA).
31. See Laura E. Simmons, Cornerstone Research, Post-Reform Act Securities
Lawsuits: Settlements Reported Through December 2001, at 6-7 (2002), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEWJ1995-2001/Settlements.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). In addition, Professors Adam Pritchard and Hillary Sale
find that allegations of violations of accounting principles, other than those relating to
revenue recognition, correlate negatively with dismissal, particularly in the Second Circuit.
See A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of
Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 24-25 (Univ. of
Iowa Coll. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 05-12, 2003), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=439503 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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prove the defendant's actual knowledge of the falsity of the forward-look-
ing statement.32 A 2004 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers summarizes
the empirical evidence and reports that: "Cases alleging 'accounting'-
related securities fraud versus cases alleging 'non-accounting'-related dis-
closure fraud divide roughly 60/40 percent; this has been a relatively con-
stant statistic since 1996." 3 3 Thus, although it would be an overstatement
to say that the securities class action exclusively polices fraud in financial
reporting, this seems to be its primary role.
B. The Compensatory Rationale
From a compensatory perspective, the conclusion seems inescapable
that the securities class action performs poorly. Settlements recover only
a very small share of investor losses. NERA Economic Consulting annu-
ally prepares a table showing the ratio of settlements to investor losses,
and between 1991 and 2004, this ratio has never exceeded 7.2% (which it
hit in 1996).34 Over the most recent three years for which data are avail-
able (i.e., 2002, 2003, and 2004), this ratio fell to 2.7%, 2.9%, and 2.3%,
respectively. 35 To be sure, these ratios represent the relation between the
settlement and overall investor losses based on the decline in stock price,
not the smaller loss directly attributable to fraud. But the market decline
is the only loss that investors experience or that can be reliably measured.
Not only is the trend downward in terms of the percentage of dam-
ages recovered, but NERA's prediction is that the ratio will continue to
decline as "mega-settlements" in the multibillion dollar range increase,
because settlement size cannot keep pace with the increasing scale of in-
vestor losses. 3 6 Moreover, these low percentages in the 2% to 3% range
32. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (1) (B) (2000).
Not all authorities agree on this point. Pritchard and Sale find, at least in the Second
Circuit, that allegations of false forward-looking statements are less likely to be dismissed.
Pritchard & Sale, supra note 31, at 25-26. But this finding was limited to the Second
Circuit.
33. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2004 Securities Litigation Study 11 (2004),
available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/eng/cfr/gecs/pwc-2004_seclit.study.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). A significant percentage of these "accounting-related"
cases involve a financial statement restatement. The percentage of "accounting-related"
cases involving a restatement was formerly over 50%, but has recently declined noticeably:
50% in 1999; 51% in 2000; 56% in 2001; 51% in 2002; 33% in 2003; and 35% in 2004. Id.
34. See Elaine Buckberg et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in
Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Are WorldCom and Enron the New Standard? 6
(2005), available at http://www.nera.com/Publication.asp?p-ID=2544 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Buckberg et al., New Standard].
35. Id.
36. NERA Economic Consulting estimates that, on average, "a 1.0% increase in
investor losses results in a 0.4% increase in the size of the expected settlement." Id. Thus,
as investors' losses in recent "mega" cases have increased, it is predictable that settlement
size will decline as a percentage of these losses. Among the reasons for this declining
relationship are both the inevitable limits on corporate solvency and the ceilings on
insurance coverage.
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are before the subtraction of the full costs that investors bear: plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees and expenses, defense counsels' fees and expenses, Direc-
tors' and Officers' (D&O) insurance premiums, and the possible costs of
disruption, stigma, and adverse publicity-all of which inevitably also fall
on the corporation's shareholders.
The sum of these costs approaches and may exceed the aggregate
recovery. For example, during at least the 1990s, plaintiffs' attorneys in
securities class actions received fee awards on average equal to 32% of the
recovery. 37 Less is known about the costs of defense counsel, but senior
insurance industry experts have estimated that defense costs in securities
litigation are often in the range of 25% to 35% of the settlement, and
sometimes reach 50% or even 100% of the settlement.3 8 The primary
reason for the high level of defense costs in securities litigation is that
D&O insurance, which all public corporations carry, is unique. Unlike
most forms of liability insurance, where the insurer provides and controls
the defense, thereby reducing the insurer's loss ex post, D&O insurance
gives no control over the defense to the insurer, but simply reimburses
the policyholders' defense costs up to the dollar limit of the policy, sub-
ject to the requirement that the defense costs be reasonable.39 As a re-
sult, D&O insurers have little ability to control defense costs. Indeed, one
recent study reports a case in which defense counsel billed "$75 million
37. See Denise N. Martin et al,, Recent Trends IV: What Explains Filings and
Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 121, 141 (1999). With
the advent of the lead plaintiff, and with larger recoveries, this percentage may have
declined more recently.
38. In their study of D&O insurers, Professors Baker and Griffith quote "one senior
underwriter" speaking at a D&O industry conference estimating that "defense costs were
commonly twenty five to thirty five percent of the settlement amount" and sometimes as
high as "50% or 100% of the settlement." See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing
Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 Geo.
L.J. (forthcomingJune 2007) (manuscript at 22 n.91, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor]. Other data, however, suggest that
defense costs are lower. The Tillinghast survey reports that the median and mean defense
costs were $538,150 and $1,965,079 per claim. Id. (manuscript at 22) (citing Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin, Directors and Officers Liability Survey: 2005 Survey on Claims and
Insurance Purchasing Trends 112 tbl.107 (2005)). On this basis, Baker and Griffith place
defense costs at around 11% of the settlement costs. Id. This seems a very low estimate,
possibly because the Tillinghast survey includes claims (such as derivative actions) that on
average settle more cheaply than the typical securities class actions or possibly because
many D&O policies covering the corporation have deductibles, and thus the full defense
cost would not be known to the issuer.
39. Id. (manuscript at 21). D&O insurance contracts give the insured the right to
choose their own counsel and manage their defense. Although the policy does not cover
"unreasonable" litigation expenses, very little that experienced defense counsel does can
be called unreasonable, even if it involves using highly paid expert witnesses or consultants.
Such insurance is obviously more expensive, but insurers have found that corporate
managers want, and will pay for, policies that maximize corporate managers' autonomy
and allow them to hire the most expensive defense counsel.
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in the course of 18 months. ' 40 High defense costs in turn imply a higher
insurance premium, as the insurer passes its costs back to the corporation
and its shareholders .4  As a result, it is an open question as to whether
the typical securities class action settlement actually produces any net re-
covery, particularly to diversified shareholders.
42
Equally inconsistent with the compensatory rationale for the securi-
ties class action is the disquieting fact that the majority of institutional
investors who have provable losses appear not to submit claims in securi-
ties class actions.4 3 By some estimates, as much as $1.05 billion annually
is forfeited in this fashion by institutional investors who seem indifferent
to relatively small recoveries. 44 At the least, this evidence suggests indif-
ference by many investors to the compensatory role of the securities class
action.
C. The Deterrence Rationale
But if the securities class action fails as a mechanism for compensa-
tion, it can still perform admirably as a form of deterrence. Indeed, its
deficiencies from a compensatory perspective may even be virtues from a
deterrent perspective. That the securities class action recovers only a
small percentage of investor losses presents less of a problem from a de-
terrent perspective because the corporate decisionmakers who caused the
corporation to violate the securities law will also only receive a gain equal
to a small portion of the investors' losses. Typically, in the context of the
standard secondary market "stock drop" case in which the defendant cor-
poration is not selling its shares, the corporation receives no direct gain,
and its officers and other insiders profit only to the extent that they sell
40. Id. (manuscript at 23) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting unnamed
D&O product manager at leading D&O insurance company).
41. By definition, insurance premiums equal the "actuarially determined probability
of loss plus a loading fee to compensate the insurer" for its costs and provide it with a
profit. Id. (manuscript at 30). This loading fee is generally estimated to be in the range of
20% to 30%. Id. at 31 (manuscript at n.123). Baker and Griffith argue that the existing
form of D&O insurance "does not simply distribute the risk of legally compensable
investment losses" but rather "likely increases those losses." Id. (manuscript at 29).
42. The diversified shareholder will bear on a pro rata basis the litigation costs of the
overall corporate community. By definition, these costs must exceed the payout by
insurers by a margin sufficient to earn insurers a risk-adjusted profit. See supra notes
38-41 and accompanying text. This raises the puzzle as to why public corporations insure
their own liability, almost uniquely, in this context. See infra notes 127-133 and
accompanying text.
43. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your
Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions
to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411, 413 (2005)
(estimating that less than 30% of institutional investors with provable losses filed claims);
see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 855, 879 (2002)
(finding that many institutional investors are failing to file securities class action claims).
44. See A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 883, 883-84 (2002) (analyzing
Cox and Thomas's data).
15472006]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
their shares or otherwise benefit from the corporation's inflated stock
price. In principle, if insiders face an expected penalty that exceeds their
expected gain, this should be sufficient to remove any incentive for them
to inflate the corporation's stock price. Indeed, if the typical securities
class action settlement vastly exceeded the insiders' expected gains, a
danger of overdeterrence would arise that might make insiders exces-
sively risk averse in their decisionmaking about accounting, forecasting,
and investment policies for their corporation.
But this theoretical answer that the securities class action can deter,
even if it cannot compensate effectively, encounters serious problems
once we examine the reality of actual securities litigation. On the positive
side of the ledger, securities class actions do seem sufficiently pervasive to
constitute a deterrent threat for most public corporations. In fact, the
incidence of securities class actions has increased over the last several de-
cades. 45 Between 1996 and 2004, an average of 195 securities class ac-
tions were filed each year-hardly a trivial number.46 Alternatively, if one
looks simply at the universe of listed public companies-i.e., issuers listed
on the NYSE, Nasdaq, or AMEX-then between 2.1% and 2.8% of these
companies have been defendants in securities class actions at the start of
each year since 1998. 4 7 One recent study concludes that "the average
public corporation faces a 10% probability that it will face at least one
shareholder class action lawsuit" over a five-year period.48 In short, al-
though securities litigation is not an inevitable fact of corporate life, it is
sufficiently common that corporate planners must anticipate and prepare
for it. Whether an individual corporation will be sued in a securities class
action is likely to depend principally on three factors: (1) its stock price
volatility; (2) its industry classification, with consumer goods, technology,
communications, and finance companies being the recent preferred
45. Over the period of 1971 to 1978, one early study identified some 228 shareholder
suits brought against a sample of 190 firms, for a mean of 1.2 lawsuits per firm over this
seven-year interval. Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of
Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 306, 312
(1980). Bohn and Choi found that in the case of initial public offerings between 1975 and
1986, less than 1% of small offerings (under $1.79 million) resulted in litigation, but 12%
of those over approximately $40 million did. See Bohn & Choi, supra note 1, at 936.
46. See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2005: A Year in
Review 3 (2005), available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2005.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). In 2005, the number of securities class actions filed fell to
176, down from 213 in 2004. Id. In 2006, the decline has accelerated, with the number of
filings of new securities class actions falling by 45% during the first six months of 2006. See
Davies, Class Inaction, supra note 12. Although this is a brief period, it suggests that a
continued high rate of securities class actions cannot be automatically assumed.
47. Cornerstone Research, supra note 46, at 4. This percentage was 2.8% in 2004, but
fell to 2.4% in 2005. Id.
48. See Buckberg et al., New Standard, supra note 34, at 2. This study was based on
the 2004 case filing rate. As the number of class actions filed in 2005 declined, this
estimated 10% probability may prove somewhat high.
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targets; 49 and (3) its market capitalization.5 11 Larger firms are sued more
often and can suffer greater damages.
5'
From a deterrent perspective, the critical question is who gets sued
and who actually bears the costs of a securities class action. As will be
seen, the answers to these two questions differ. Initially, the evidence is
clear that members of senior management are highly likely to be named
as codefendants in any securities litigation.5 2 PricewaterhouseCoopers
has concisely summarized these data for corporate officers for the years
2001-2004.
5 3
TABLE 4: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS
NAMING CERTAIN OFFICERS, 2001-2004
Title 2002 2003 2004
CEO 95 98 96
CFO 76 88 83
Chairman 82 69 72
President 68 77 71
In sharp contrast, however, outside directors are rarely sued in secur-
ities fraud class actions 54 and are held liable even more rarely. 55 Why are
insiders frequently sued and outside directors not? The answer probably
lies in the pleading requirements of the PSLRA, which require the com-
plaint to raise a strong inference of fraud against any named defendant.
56
This can be done, possibly with some difficulty, in the case of insiders, but
satisfying this pleading standard is extremely difficult in the case of the
outside director. Because the outside director is typically remote from
the corporation and not cognizant of the facts known to management on
a day-to-day basis, fraud cannot easily be attributed to such a person, par-
ticularly before the plaintiff obtains discovery.
49. Cornerstone Research, supra note 46, at 14. These were the four leading
categories in 2005. The lowest filings rates were in the Basic Materials, Utilities, and
Energy Companies, possibly reflecting either greater recent economic success in those
industries or lower price volatility.
50. D&O insurers consider market capitalization to be strongly correlated with both
the frequency and severity of loss. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74
U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming March 2007) (manuscript at 29-30, on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
51. Id. (manuscript at 30).
52. For the data on corporate officers, see PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra note
33, at 16.
53. Id.
54. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859, 896 & tbl.3 (2003)
(finding that in sample that included approximately half of securities class actions filed in
1999, outside directors were named in only twenty-one cases).
55. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
56. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D (b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (2000).
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This same pattern of virtual immunity carries over to the case of the
corporation's principal agents or gatekeepers. Auditors and underwriters
appear to be named as defendants in only a very low percentage of securi-
ties class actions. According to Cornerstone Research, auditors were
named as defendants in only five cases (or 3%) out of all securities class
actions filed in 2005 and similarly were named in only eight cases (or 4%)
out of all such actions filed in 2004. 5 7 Correspondingly, underwriters
were named in only seven cases (or 4%) in 2005 and three cases (or 1%)
in 2004.58 Previously, secondary participants faced a higher likelihood of
securities litigation, but this pattern shifted in the mid-1990s when the
combined impact of the PSLRA and the Supreme Court's 1994 decision
in Central Bank of Denver, which held that Rule lOb-5 did not reach those
"aiding and abetting" a securities fraud, 59 caused litigation against
secondary participants to drop off sharply. Because the majority of secur-
ities class actions contain at least some allegations of accounting fraud,
60
this striking omission of auditors and other secondary actors as defend-
ants suggests that they have been well insulated against securities fraud
liability. Although large settlements involving accounting firms do occur,
these often involve the insolvency of the corporate defendant (as in
Enron and WorldCom) so that the auditor becomes the defendant of last
resort-namely, the remaining defendant with a deep pocket.
The strangest aspect of this pattern involves corporate insiders-ex-
ecutive officers and controlling shareholders. Although they are regu-
larly sued, they rarely appear to contribute to the settlement. Rather, the
corporate defendant and its insurer typically advance the entire settle-
ment amount. For example, one study of securities class actions in the
mid-1990s found that, even in cases in which officers and directors were
named as defendants, liability insurers paid on average 68.2% of the set-
tlement, and the defendant corporation paid 31.4%-leaving at most
0.4% to be paid by individual defendants. 61 Others have noted "that ap-
proximately 96% of securities class action settlements are within the typi-
57. Cornerstone Research, supra note 46, at 16. These data, which cover only the
initial complaint, do not mean that auditors are sued in only 3% or 4% of all securities
class actions, because the class action may be amended later to add the auditor as a
defendant after the plaintiff obtains discovery. But this is difficult to do because of the
short statute of limitations on most securities law causes of action and the fact that the
plaintiff can only obtain discovery under the PSLRA if it has first satisfied that statute's
particularized pleading standard (which often requires multiple efforts).
58. Id.
59. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 175-78, 191
(1994).
60. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. In particular,
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that 60% of securities fraud cases are "accounting"
related. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra note 33, at 11.
61. See Frederick C. Dunbar et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends III: What
Explains Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions? 9 (1995). This 0.4% that remains is
not necessarily paid by officers and other insiders, but could be paid by other secondary
defendants or could be payments that the SEC has compelled these individual defendants
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cal insurance coverage, with insurance proceeds often being the sole
source of settlement funds. '6 2 Professor Janet Alexander, a knowledge-
able observer, has concluded concisely that "[i]ndividual defendants al-
most never contribute personally to settlements." 63 The reality is that
corporate insiders are sued in order for the plaintiffs to gain access to
their insurance, but their personal liability appears not to be seriously
pursued.
To the extent that there are exceptions to this generalization, they
usually involve special facts, typically that either: (1) The defendant cor-
poration has become insolvent and hence is judgment-prooPf 4 (Enron
and WorldCom fall within this category); (2) individual defendants face
criminal liability and agree to make partial restitution either to gain a
reduced sentence or to avoid indictment; or (3) D&O insurance is either
inadequate or the policy has been rescinded for fraud in the application.
In these cases, where there is, in effect, no deep-pocketed corporate de-
fendant to bail out its officers, plaintiffs can and do obtain recoveries
from individuals. But the rarity of these individual settlements is striking.
Studying litigation against outside directors, Professors Bernard Black,
Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner investigated the 3,239 federal se-
curities class actions that were filed between 1991 and 2004, of which
1,754 had settled by the end of 2004. Contacting counsel for both sides,
other leading law firms, D&O insurers, and D&O brokers, they were able
to identify only thirteen settlements "since 1980 in which outside direc-
tors made out-of-pocket payments. '65 Three of these cases involved fa-
mous frauds-WorldCom, Enron, and Tyco-but the remainder chiefly
to make to a restitution fund pursuant to an SEC settlement, for which a credit may be
given in the class action settlement.
62. See Cox, supra note 4, at 512 (citing Private Litigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 139 (1993) (statement of Vincent E.
O'Brien)). For an estimate that."from 50% to 80% of the typical settlement.., is paid by
insurance," see Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial
Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 17, 46 (1993).
63. Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan.
L. Rev. 1487, 1499 (1996) [hereinafter Alexander, Rethinking Damages].
64. Securities class actions tend less frequently to be filed in the wake of bankruptcy
because the usually deep-pocketed corporate defendant can no longer be sued once it has
entered bankruptcy. Examining the class actions filed in 2004 and 2005, Cornerstone
Research found only eight class actions in 2005 (out of the 176 filed-or 5%) that were
filed subsequent to a corporation's bankruptcy and only four class actions in 2004 (out of
the 213 filed-or 2%) that similarly followed a bankruptcy. Cornerstone Research, supra
note 46, at 16. Hence, although insiders and secondary participants are the only parties
that can be sued once bankruptcy has been filed, few such suits are brought.
65. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055, 1068 (2006)
[hereinafter Black et al., Director Liability]; see also Bernard Black et al., Outside Director
Liability 34-35 (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 250, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=382422 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing "several downside risks" and "limited upside" for
plaintiffs going to trial against directors for out-of-pocket expenses).
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involved "insolvent companies with serious D&O coverage problems."66
Their conclusion that outside directors with "state of the art" D&O liabil-
ity insurance face little risk does not necessarily apply, however, to insid-
ers and controlling shareholders.
Within the context of "insiders" (a term that will be used to include
senior executives, founders, and controlling shareholders), the largest
payment by an individual in a securities class action is believed to have
been made by Gary Winnick, the former chairman of Global Crossing
Ltd., which filed for bankruptcy in January 2002, not long after Enron,
with $12.4 billion in debt outstanding. 67 Winnick paid a reported $55
million, $30 million toward a settlement fund for investors and another
$25 million to compensate employees for their lost retirement savings. 68
This settlement came only a month before Winnick reached a settlement
with the SEC, and Winnick may well have received (or at least antici-
pated) concessions in his SEC settlement because of his contribution to
the class settlement. In any event, the remainder of the Global Crossing
class action settlement came from the company's insurers, which paid
$261 million, and from the company's former law firm, which paid $19
million. 69 Given that Winnick's payment is apparently the largest individ-
ual payment on record, does even it demonstrate a sanction sufficient to
deter? Symptomatically, the facts show that Winnick sold $734 million in
company stock shortly before Global Crossing's bankruptcy, so that his
$55 million contribution to these settlements represented well under
10% of the alleged gains that he personally received.
70
Other cases in which personal liability was imposed on insiders fit
the same general pattern. Both Bernard Ebbers, the WorldCom CEO,
and the family of John Rigas, the founder of Adelphia, contributed per-
sonal funds to class action settlements, but at the time they did so, their
firms were bankrupt, and they were facing sentencing following a felony
conviction (and thus had every incentive to appear contrite and repen-
tant).71 Similarly, the WorldCom directors were required to contribute
66. See Black et al., Director Liability, supra note 65, at 1069.
67. For the conclusion that $55 million was the largest payment made by an individual
out of his own pocket, see The Plaintiffs' Hot List, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 10, 2005, at S8 (citing
plaintiff's counsel, Grant & Eisenhofer, for this estimate).
68. Carrie Johnson, Global Crossing Case May Be Ending: 3 Former Leaders Reach
Tentative Accord with SEC, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 2004, at El.
69. Id.
70. See id.; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Ebbers Set to Shed Assets, N.Y. Times, July
1, 2005, at C1 (stating that Winnick paid out "a fraction" of $734 million he made).
71. Following his conviction in 2005 and before his sentencing, Bernard Ebbers, the
founder of WorldCom, contributed some $40 million to the WorldCom class action
settlement, which at the time represented "nearly all of his personal fortune." Morgenson,
supra note 70. In the case of Adelphia, the entire Rigas family, including certain family
members who were not charged with any crime, consented to the forfeiture of designated
assets, including cable television systems and nearly all their Adelphia securities, in return
for the government's waiver of criminal fines and/or forfeiture against John and Timothy
Rigas at their criminal sentencing; this property was then to be transferred by the
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20% of their net worth to a settlement fund, 72 but this was both because
their corporation was insolvent and their potential liability vastly ex-
ceeded their insurance resources.
In the more typical case of the solvent corporation, however, the like-
lihood is that the insurer will cover everything-i.e., the settlement plus
litigation expenses-up to its policy limits, and the corporation will pick
up the balance. 73 Even if one assumes that the market for D&O insur-
ance is efficient and tailors premiums to the individual issuer's risk level,
an assumption that has long been debated,7 4 the cost of insurance still
falls on shareholders, and this cost becomes heavier as the company be-
comes riskier. As a result, if the insiders who are most culpable can ap-
parently escape personal liability in securities class actions, then the de-
terrent rationale for that action seems largely undercut. At best, the
efficacy of deterrence under the current system rests on the validity of
enterprise liability: that is, on the claim that by imposing large penalties
on the corporation, society induces increased monitoring of the corpo-
rate officials who benefit from securities fraud.
75
government to Adelphia in return for Adelphia's transfer of $715 million in value to the
government. See Peter D. Morgenstern & Eric B. Fisher, New Clout for Victims in
Criminal Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 2005, at 4. In substance, then, the civil
contribution by the Rigas family was coerced by the prospect of the criminal sentencing.
For a fuller description of the entire transaction (and a decision upholding it), see In re
W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 557-60 (2d Cir. 2005).
72. The twelve independent directors of WorldCom paid some $25 million based on a
requirement that they contribute 20% of their net worth, as defined to exclude certain
retirement-related assets. E-mail from Sean Coffey, Partner, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger &
Grossman LLP, to author (Aug. 15, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Bernstein, Litowitz served as counsel to the plaintiff class in the WorldCom class action.
73. Sometimes, particularly when the corporation is insolvent, the insurer will seek to
rescind its policy based on its claim that fraudulent misrepresentations were made to it.
See infra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
74. The nature of the market for D&O liability insurance has long been debated.
Over a decade ago, Kent Syverud argued that the demand for liability insurance was
inelastic, and thus insurers can expect to be able to pass along fully the liability costs that
they bear to their corporate clients in the form of increased insurance premiums. Kent D.
Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1629, 1644-49 (1994).
This thesis is controversial, but even if demand is not inelastic and even if insurers do
evaluate the corporation's risk level ex ante, the market may still be one in which corporate
managers prefer to pay high premiums, rather than limit their autonomy, either in the
choice or monitoring of defense counsel, or commit to loss prevention measures. Why?
The simple answer is that the potential cost savings on D&O insurance are not important
to them, whereas control over the litigation's management is. This appears to be the
conclusion of Baker and Griffith. Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 38
(manuscript at 4-5, 12-25). They conclude, as does this Essay, that "D&O insurance seems
likely to increase the amount of shareholder losses due to securities law violations." Id.
(manuscript at 4).
75. For a general overview of this issue, see Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related
Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 571-81 (1988). Professor Sykes argues that placing
vicarious liability on the employer (or principal) for the employee's (or agent's)
misconduct tends to be inefficient if (a) the enterprise did not cause the wrong, and (b)
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Before reaching any bottom line assessment, however, fairness re-
quires the observation that nonfinancial consequences of a securities
class action might conceivably also deter. For example, some research
has found that securities class actions tend to result in CEO turnovers in
their wake. 76 In one study, the filing of a securities class action was found
to more than double the likelihood of a CEO turnover, increasing it from
9.8% before the filing to 23.4% afterwards. 77 Realistically, however, even
if the risk of ouster for the insider were to exceed 25%, this risk, by itself,
would seldom constitute a deterrent threat capable of offsetting the po-
tentially enormous financial gains to insiders from inflating the firm's
stock price.78 The problem is that the corporate officer who faces the
greatest exposure to ouster also probably has the greatest incentive to
inflate the firm's financial results; this is a classic "final-period problem"
for which market and private sanctions rarely work.
79
The policy prescription that flows from this analysis may seem obvi-
ous: The law should attempt to impose a greater share of the securities
class action's costs on the more culpable insiders. But a counter-
argument also deserves attention: The scale of the change that would be
necessary is so great and the financial resources of insiders so limited that
meaningful change may be infeasible. Even at first glance, it is evident
that securities class actions often result in enormous settlements to which
the enterprise cannot effectively reduce the probability of the wrong through contracting
with its employee or agent. Id. at 575. For a discussion on this topic, see infra notes
101-103 and accompanying text.
76. See Philip E. Strahan, Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and
Managerial Agency Problems 18-25 (June 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=104356.
77. Id. at 22.
78. Again, the example of Gary Winnick, the CEO of Global Crossing, illustrates the
problem. He did resign under pressure and contributed $55 million to the settlement of
class actions, but he sold $734 million in Global Crossing stock shortly before his firm's
bankruptcy. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. Similarly, in the case of
Enron, the top three executives "earned more than $100 million each in 2000," and
Enron's total compensation to its top 200 executives soared from $193 million in 1998 to
$1.4 billion in 2000, a sevenfold increase. Alan Murray, Twelve Angry CEOs-the Ideal
Enron Jury, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A2.
79. "Final-period" problems classically arise as the corporation approaches
bankruptcy or as the manager faces the prospect ofjob loss. The more that the manager
expects ouster, the more that the manager's incentives are no longer aligned with those of
the shareholders, and the manager cannot be as easily deterred by future private sanctions
or reputational loss. For descriptions of this problem, see Mitu Gulati, When Corporate
Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46
UCLA L. Rev. 675, 694-95 (1999) (describing impact of "final-period problem" on
managerial decisionmaking); Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some
Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 Duke L.J. 1397, 1426 n.132
(2002) (describing conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders during final
period). Here, the manager who realizes that current earnings cannot be sustained and
that the corporation's stock price will eventually fall has a powerful incentive to delay the
market's recognition of this decline until after the manager's options have vested and the
manager has sold his stock.
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insiders could conceivably contribute no more than a modest percentage.
For example, the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
lists the ten largest securities class action settlements since the passage of
the PSLRA, and, as of early 2006, the cases on this list settled for amounts
ranging from $7.1 billion down to $574 million:8 0
TABLE 5: LARGEST SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
Rank Issuer Maximum Asserted Valuation
1 Enron $7,160.5 Million
2 WorldCom $6,156.3 Million
3 Cendant $3,528.0 Million
4 AOL Time Warner $2,500.0 Million
5 Nortel Networks $2,473.6 Million
6 Royal Ahold $1,091.0 Million
7 IPO Allocation Litigation $1,000.0 Million
8 McKesson HBOC $960.0 Million
9 Lucent Technologies $673.4 Million
10 Bristol-Myers Squibb $574.0 Million
Obviously, officers and other insiders lack the assets to contribute
more than a modest fraction to such "mega-settlements." But this is less
of an obstacle to deterrence than it may initially appear for three reasons.
First, the mean and median settlements in securities class actions are
much smaller.8 ' Second, a full transfer of the costs to the more culpable
insiders is not necessary to achieve deterrence. All that is needed is that
the expected penalty, which would include both the financial and nonfi-
nancial costs of a securities class action settlement, exceed the expected
gain. Third, D&O insurance provides far less protection to insiders than
it does to outside directors. Insurance companies can seek to rescind the
policies applicable to insiders for fraud in the application (and are cur-
rently seeking to do so) or can assert the traditional exclusions to cover-
80. Stanford Law Sch. Sec. Class Action Clearinghouse, Post-Reform Act Securities
Case Settlements: Securities Fraud "Top Ten Mega-Settlements" List (2006), at http://
securities.stanford.edu/topten_list.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
81. NERA Economic Consulting and Cornerstone Research both report mean and
median data on securities class action settlements. In 2004, NERA reports that the mean
settlement rose by 33% to $27.1 million, while the median settlement fell to $5.3 million
from $5.5 million in 2003. See Elaine Buckberg et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent
Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Bear Market Cases Bring Big Settlements 4
(2005), available at http://www.nera.com/image/RecentTrendsFinal_2.28.05.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Cornerstone Research found the median settlement in
2004 to be $6.0 million (down from $6.2 million over the period from 1995 to 2003) and
the average settlement to be $24.6 million (up from $19.2 million over the 1995 to 2003
period). See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Post-Reform Act
Securities Settlements: Updated Through December 2004, at 2 (2005), available at http://
www.cornerstone.com/framres.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In common,
these data show that most securities class actions settle for amounts that are well within the
personal assets of insiders, but there is a long tail to the right on the dispersion curve of
settlements, with an increasing number of very large mega-settlements.
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age in such cases.8 2 In addition, as the foregoing list shows, many settle-
ments are now exceeding the ceiling on insurance coverage. No
corporation can afford to insure its board for $1 billion; nor are insurers
willing to offer coverage in such amounts83 (indeed, insurance at such a
level might even invite litigation). As a result, at least the insider defen-
dant can no longer confidently rely on liability insurance in all cases.
II. THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM: WHEN Do WEALTH TRANSFERS AMONG
SHAREHOLDERS MAKE SENSE?
At the outset, a basic distinction must be drawn between two types of
securities class actions: (1) those that challenge actual sales of securities
by an issuer, and (2) those in which the plaintiff purchases instead from
another shareholder, but asserts that the issuer's materially misleading
statements or omissions caused the plaintiffs to purchase the company's
stock at an inflated price in the secondary market.8 4 In the former "pri-
mary market" case, there is at least some privity between the plaintiffs and
the corporate issuer, and the plaintiff class is effectively asserting that the
other shareholders profited at its expense because of the inflated price of
the issuer's stock. But in the latter "secondary market" case, neither the
defendant corporation nor its continuing shareholders ordinarily benefit
from the plaintiffs' purchases. Typically, the shareholders who will bear
the recovery are innocent of any wrongdoing. Moreover, the plaintiffs
and defendants tend to overlap heavily because many shareholders are in
both classes, having bought stock at different times.8 5 The key distinction
here is that, in the first case, the existing shareholders benefit when their
corporation sells stock at an inflated price to the plaintiffs, but, in the
82. With respect to attempts to rescind insurance policies for fraud in the application,
see infra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. Also, the typical D&O policy contains
exclusions on coverage that are more likely to apply to insiders than to outside directors.
The D&O policy usually excludes claims based on "fraudulent, dishonest or criminal"
misconduct or based on transactions in which the insured received "any personal profit or
advantage to which [he] is not legally entitled." 2 William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey,
Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors §§ 25.03, 25.13 (7th ed. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
83. Currently, D&O insurers appear to be placing a ceiling of $300 million on the
insurance that they will offer. See Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 38
(manuscript at 10) (citing interviews with industry officials).
84. This primary/secondary distinction is a standard one that is made in virtually all
securities regulation casebooks. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Joel Seligman, Securities
Regulation: Cases & Materials 21 (9th ed. 2003) ("It is conventional to distinguish the
primary market (i.e., issuer transactions in which shares are sold to investors) from the
secondary market (trading transactions between investors).").
85. If an investor-individual or institutional-wishes to remain diversified, it will be
necessary for it to make continuing purchases as its portfolio increases. Thus, even a
passive and indexed mutual or pension fund will be buying the same stocks on a
continuing basis. Because the typical class period is under one year, see infra note 94, it is
likely that such an investor will have purchased some of its holdings in the defendant
corporation before the class period commenced, and thus it will straddle the class period's
boundary line.
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second case, the continuing shareholders seldom receive any benefit-
direct or indirect-from the sales by former shareholders at inflated
prices to the plaintiff class members. As a result, the moral entitlement of
the plaintiff class to seek its recovery from the equally nonculpable con-
tinuing shareholders seems debatable at least.
That much may seem obvious. But the circularity problem is subtler
still, as the real costs do not fall on all shareholders evenly, but are borne
unequally by different classes of shareholders. This section will examine
the differential impact of securities class action litigation on diversified
and undiversified shareholders and then examine whether the deterrent
benefits can justify these costs.
A. Case One: The Simple Wealth Transfer
Because of the long-established separation of ownership and control
in the United States, the vast majority of stock in "public" companies is
owned by dispersed shareholders, all holding relatively small percentage
stakes.8 6 When a "secondary market" securities class action is brought
against a public corporation that has not sold or purchased its own securi-
ties, the action is essentially brought on behalf of shareholders (and for-
mer shareholders) who purchased the stock during the "class period"
(i.e., the time period during which the market was allegedly affected by
material misinformation) .87 Typically, this class period will end on the
date that corrective disclosure is made (and the market price of the stock
declines in response). 88 Anyjudgment or settlement in this action will be
borne by the corporation (and thus indirectly by all its current sharehold-
ers).89 As a result, securities litigation in this context inherently results in
a wealth transfer between two classes of public shareholders-those in
the class period and those outside it-and typically neither class is culpa-
ble. Worse still, the most likely beneficiaries of the fraud will be the insid-
86. The dispersed character of U.S. stock ownership was first recognized by Berle and
Means over seventy years ago. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property 47-68 (1932) (describing growth in number of
shareholders per corporation and dilution of large ownership stakes across companies and
industries). The distribution of stock between individual and retail ownership has
continually changed, with institutions now owning roughly 50%, but the separation of
ownership and control has been constant. See Coffee & Seligman, supra note 84, at 43-46
(showing breakdown of share ownership by ownership categories in public corporations).
87. That is, the class will typically be defined as all persons who bought the stock of
the issuer beginning on date X and ending on date Y, excluding any of the defendants.
88. Once corrective disclosure is made, the alleged fraud is at an end. Even if
individual shareholders might remain deceived when they later purchase the stock, the
premise of the securities class action is that the market will immediately incorporate into
the stock price both the original fraudulent disclosure and the corrective disclosure. See
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988). Thus, they are not injured by a
postcorrective disclosure purchase.
89. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (indicating that insurers and
corporation bear entire cost of securities class action settlements). Costs borne by the
corporation are by definition indirectly borne by its shareholders.
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ers who sold at inflated prices. Because they bailed out prior to any judg-
ment or settlement, they will escape without bearing any cost when
liability is later imposed exclusively on their former corporation.
B. Case Two: Wealth Transfers Under the Assumption of Diversification
Often shareholders will belong to both the plaintiff class that sues
and the residual shareholder class that bears the cost of the litigation.
This can result because they purchased stock at times that are both inside
and outside the class period, so that they are on both sides of the litiga-
tion. Thus, they are effectively making wealth transfers to themselves, in
effect shifting money from one pocket to another, minus the high trans-
action costs of securities litigation.
But from a broader perspective, this is also the position of the diversi-
fied shareholder who holds stock in many corporations. That is, if one
assumes that most shareholders are diversified, the key implication of this
premise is that, on an aggregate basis, diversified investors will be share-
holders on both sides of the class period divide, sometimes being a share-
holder within the class period and sometimes a shareholder outside the
class period. As a result, at least in the aggregate, diversified investors are
largely making wealth transfers among themselves as the result of con-
temporary securities litigation. To illustrate, assume a pension fund that
holds a portfolio of 1,000 stocks, and that over a several-year period 100
of these stocks become defendants in securities litigation. Assume fur-
ther that the pension fund is in the plaintiff class in fifty cases and in the
defendant class in the other fifty cases (and maybe in both classes in
twenty-five of these cases). However large the recoveries, such an investor
cannot gain from this pocket shifting of wealth, unless third parties are
compelled to contribute to the settlement.
Worse yet, on each such wealth transfer, the continuing shareholders
will be taxed the transaction costs of the litigation, which includes the
legal fees paid to both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel, the increased
insurance premiums in the wake of the litigation, and the possible costs
of business disruption and adverse publicity to the subject company.9 0 In
addition, hidden costs are also borne by the corporation, including the
90. As noted earlier, plaintiffs' attorneys charged fees in securities class actions
amounting to 32% of the settlement during the 1990s, and some estimate the cost of
defense counsel as amounting to between 25-35% of the settlement. See supra notes
37-38 and accompanying text. Insurance premiums will cover these expenses (up to their
ceilings and minus any deductible), but the pricing of D&O insurance involves estimating
the probability of the loss and then adding a "loading fee" to assure a profit for the insurer.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Thus, from the perspective of the diversified
investor, it is clear that across all public corporations the cost of D&O insurance to all
corporations must exceed the loss experienced by all corporations (or the insurers, losing
money, would cease to write insurance). From this perspective, the diversified shareholder
loses wealth when the corporation decides to buy D&O insurance covering its own liability
(as opposed to that of its officers and directors). See Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor,
supra note 38 (manuscript at 30-34).
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cost of diverted managerial time, possible stigma, and damage to reputa-
tion. When all those costs are aggregated, the sum may often exceed the
net recovery to the class. Absent high deterrent benefits, the result seems
to be a dead weight loss to investors as a class.
C. Case Three: The Conflict Between "Buy and Hold" Investors and "In and
Out" Traders
Of course, not all investors are diversified. Clearly, most retail inves-
tors do diversify because they invest through mutual funds and pension
funds, which are required by law to diversify. 9' Large, sophisticated inves-
tors also understand the wisdom of diversification. Nonetheless, let's
make the assumption that many investors are undiversified. Undiversi-
fled investors can benefit from the securities class action (if they are lucky
enough to be in the plaintiff class and not in the class of existing share-
holders). But in reality, small undiversified investors are seldom likely to
receive a monetary benefit from the securities class action. Indeed, their
position is even more exposed than the diversified investor's. This is be-
cause the typical small, undiversified investor is likely to be a "buy and
hold" investor who does not trade frequently.92 Such investors trade less
91. As of 2005, nearly three-fourths of Americans' liquid financial resources were
invested in securities-related products, with mutual funds being the fastest growing
category. In contrast, in 1975, slightly more than half of American financial assets were in
bank deposits (55%). Sec. Indus. Ass'n, Key Trends in the Securities Industry, at http://
www.sia.com/research/html/keyindustry-trends_.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2005) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Savings then have moved from banks to mutual funds.
Mutual funds are clearly the fastest growing sector of the financial marketplace, now
holding 23% of all equities. See Alan R. Palmiter, U.S. Mutual Funds: The Awakening
Behemoth? 1 (May 31, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Mutual funds are basically required to diversify their investments if they wish to
classify themselves as a "diversified" fund (as most do). See Investment Company Act
§ 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (2000). For an overview of these diversification
requirements, see generally Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge
Funds and Stock Market Volatility-What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 909, 917-18 (2005). Hence, if
individual investors are moving their retirement savings to mutual funds, they are at the
same time likely becoming diversified.
92. A 2005 study jointly conducted by the Investment Company Institute and the
Securities Industry Association reports that the typical U.S. household did not trade
securities in the average year. Specifically, it found:
Because the majority of equity investors are saving for retirement and have long-
term investment horizons, most are not frequent traders. As a group, these
investors do not have a pattern of buying or selling equities in response to stock
market conditions. The share of equity investors who conducted equity
transactions in 1998, 2001, and 2004... remained steady at about 40 percent ....
Inv. Co. Inst. & Sec. Indus. Ass'n, Equity Ownership in America, 2005, at 24 (2005),
available at http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/EquityOwnershipO5.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). In short, slightly more than 60% of individual shareholders do not
trade in any given year and thus could not be members of a class that reached back less
than one year from the date of corrective disclosure. As noted below, the typical class
period is less than one year. See infra note 94.
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actively because: (1) They pay higher brokerage commission rates than
do larger investors; (2) they receive less current information than do
larger investors with closer ties to securities analysts; and (3) they are not
professionals who can watch their investments constantly.93 As a result,
because of their typically longer holding period, individual "buy and
hold" investors are more likely to have purchased their stock before the
class period commenced.
94
As a result, securities class actions seem likely to transfer wealth sys-
tematically from "buy and hold" investors (who bought on average
outside the class period) to more rapidly trading investors (who purchase
on average within the class period). Ironically, the clear winner under
such a system is the more rapidly trading, undiversified investor-which
is the profile of the contemporary hedge fund. The clearest loser is the
small investor who buys and holds for retirement-exactly the profile of
the American retail investor. The other major category of clear losers is
populated by the corporation's own employees, including its managers,
who hold stock as the result of equity compensation and stock option
plans. Not only do these groups lose, but also their interests are unlikely
to be given serious consideration in securities litigation today because
control of the securities class action was presumptively assigned by the
93. There is vast empirical literature on trading intensity which finds that different
classes of investors have vastly different proclivities to trade. For a brief overview, see, e.g.,
John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-Trader Model for Measuring
Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 213, 230-32 (2003);
Michael Barclay & Frank C. Torchio, A Comparison of Trading Models Used for
Calculating Aggregate Damages in Securities Litigation, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring/
Summer 2001, at 105, 117-18. As a result, most contemporary empirical models of
damages in securities litigation use a "two-trader model" which distinguishes between
"traders" and "investors." I do not assert that all retail investors follow a "buy and hold"
philosophy (indeed, some were "day traders" in the late 1990s) or that all institutional
investors are active traders (many are in fact indexed). But on average, the small investor
has a lower trading intensity than the institutional investor, in part because the former
faces much higher trading costs on a per share basis. A common heuristic used by the
modelers of securities damages is that 20% of the shareholders are active "traders" and
80% are passive "investors." If securities litigation does largely cause wealth transfers, those
transfers should systematically flow from investors to traders.
94. One empirical study has found that the mean length of the class period in
securities litigation was 358 days, with a median length of 257 days. See Willard T.
Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 491,
497 (1996). Thus, unless retail investors bought the majority of their stock interest in the
company during this period of less than a year, they will on average bear the proportionate
cost of the recovery and the litigation, but not share in any portion of the recovery. In
general, it seems a fair assumption that the typical small investor has not purchased his or
her shares within the 257 or 358 days preceding the date of corrective disclosure. This may
not be true in some special cases, such as IPO litigation, where the small investor buys in
the initial public offering. But these cases are examples of "primary market" offerings
where this Essay argues that securities litigation can work. See supra note 84-85 and
accompanying text.
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PSLRA to large diversified investors, who often have highly contrary
interests.
95
D. The Policy Debate
The essential circularity of the securities class action in the secondary
market context has not escaped the attention of legal academics. 96 But
their responses have diverged radically. One school-best typified by
Professor James Cox-argues that holding the nontrading corporation
liable for secondary market purchases is justifiable because it is consistent
with the standard rule of enterprise liability that prevails across tort law
generally. 97 In sharp contrast, another school maintains that once the
inevitable circularity of the wealth transfers in securities class actions is
recognized, the logical policy response is to convert the securities class
action into a form of civil penalty. 98 Thus, Professor Donald Langevoort
has suggested capping the damages at a low level, pointing to the
American Law Institute's (ALI) Federal Securities Code as a relevant
model.99 ProfessorJanet Cooper Alexander has similarly proposed a civil
95. Although the lead plaintiff provision in the PSLRA may be an important and
successful reform, its hidden consequence is to ensure that undiversified small
shareholders will have their interests slighted in the organization of the class action. The
PSLRA assigns control of the class action to a class member who is likely to be highly
diversified. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3)
(creating presumption that volunteering class member with "largest financial interest in
the relief sought by the class" should be lead plaintiff). Experience with this provision has
shown that the lead plaintiff will typically be a large public pension fund (which must by
law diversify) or at least another financial institution that is likely to be a diversified
investor. Hence, even if one is sympathetic to the position of the undiversified investor,
the securities class action is no longer designed to be a remedy for protecting the interests
of such persons.
96. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 698-700 (describing
how enterprise liability imposes costs of fraud upon shareholders, even though they were
not responsible for, and did not benefit from, fraud); Langevoort, supra note 2, at 642
("[W] hatever compensation comes via class actions in open market cases is funded directly
or indirectly by other innocent investors, creating a system of pocket-shifting that takes
little money out of the hands of those natural persons who contrived the fraud."); Paul G.
Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 Va. L. Rev.
623, 635 (1992) ("A 10b-5judgment, which simply transfers wealth among shareholders...
clearly will not deter managers. Even if liability could be imposed directly on managers,
the contractual nature of the firm suggests that the liability will end up back with the
shareholders.").
97. See Cox, supra note 4, at 509-12. Professor Cox argues broadly that "[t]he
financial burdens of a securities fraud settlement borne by the innocent stockholders of
the corporate violator is indistinguishable from the burden borne by the shareholders of
the corporation that produces a defective product or violates the environmental laws." Id.
at 511.
98. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 660 (favoring "use [of] the civil penalty model in
defining the maximum amount of recovery").
99. Id. at 657-58. The ALI's Federal Securities Code would limit damages for the
issuer corporation in the case of an open market fraud where the corporation was not
contemporaneously selling its securities to the greater of $100,000, 1% of the issuer's gross
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
penalty that can be enforced both by the SEC and/or plaintiffs'
attorneys.1
00
But there are problems with both lines of argument. Those who
point to tort law's general preference for enterprise liability as ajustifica-
tion for the status quo miss what is most distinctive about the securities
class action. When a corporation is fined or incurs liability in a class ac-
tion because of a defective product or environmental pollution, society is
imposing a cost on the corporation (and indirectly its shareholders) to
induce it to monitor the behavior of its managers more diligently. Share-
holders are not themselves the primary victims of the offense. Instead, a
negative externality is being internalized (at least partially) by shifting
costs from the victims of the tort to the corporation and its shareholders.
But in the case of at least the "secondary market" securities class action,
the victims and the shareholders are largely the same (at least if we as-
sume the shareholders to be diversified). Thus, enterprise liability in this
context is a strategy akin to punishing the victims of burglary for their
failure to take greater precautions. Although this strategy might produce
some enhanced monitoring, it offends social norms, including the pub-
lic's basic sense of fairness, to punish the victim for conduct that it did
not cause. Thus, the more this strategy becomes transparent, the more it
will predictably encounter both political and judicial resistance. Nor is
punishing the victim terribly effective, as victims are generally not the
best-suited persons to detect and prevent the offense (which is ultimately
why they became victims).
Defenders of the current system of enterprise liability tend to assume
that the corporation's agents and employees are engaging in legal viola-
tions to maximize profits for the corporation. But again securities litiga-
tion is distinctive. Although this assumption is generally valid when the
corporation sells a defective product or pollutes the environment, the
corporate manager usually has more self-interested reasons for inflating
the firm's earnings. Except in the case where the corporation is itself
issuing shares, securities fraud appears to be primarily motivated by the
manager's own personal interests. Typically, managers hide bad news be-
cause they fear loss of theirjobs (either from a dismissal or a hostile take-
over), and they overstate favorable developments or inflate earnings in
order to maximize the value of their stock options and other equity com-
income (to a maximum of $1,000,000), or any profits received, unless the fraud was made
with knowledge by the defendants. Fed. Sec. Code § 1708(c) (2) (1980).
100. See Alexander, Rethinking Damages, supra note 63, at 1489. As she points out,
such civil penalties are sometimes enforced by private litigation under which the successful
plaintiff's attorney receives attorney's fees. Id. at 1509 (citing Clean Water Act, Clean Air
Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and other environmental statutes). Under
her proposal, the SEC would receive the first option to sue and, if it did not, then private
plaintiffs could sue. Id. at 1523. Obviously, this approach significantly erodes the
incentive to search for legal violations, as the private plaintiff (or plaintiff's attorney) who
incurs costs to identify a violation would not profit unless and until the SEC declined to
sue.
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pensation. After analyzing a large sample of class actions,' 0 ' Professors
Arlen and Carney report that managerial self-interest seems to be the
dominant motivation underlying securities fraud, with managers fre-
quently engaging in behavior that closely resembles insider trading.
10 2 If
so, enterprise liability may work less well than a strategy that focuses di-
rectly on the managers themselves.
10 3
On the other hand, use of a civil penalty system (as Professors
Langevoort and Alexander have each independently proposed) could
well underdeter. The $1 million ceiling proposed by the ALI's Federal
Securities Code now seems dwarfed by the potential gains in recent secur-
ities frauds. 10 4 Worse yet, even if a civil penalty system were to be en-
forced by private litigation, the incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring
such actions would be modest in comparison to their current incentive to
prosecute securities class actions. Assume for the sake of simplicity that
the plaintiffs attorney will receive on average a fee award of around 25%
of a class action settlement.1 0 5 Mega-settlements of over $100 million in
101. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 96, at 721-24.
102. Id. at 702-03, 720-40.
103. Professors Arlen and Carney argue that "enterprise liability for Fraud on the
Market is not better able to deter Fraud on the Market than is agent liability" and that
"agent liability probably achieves superior deterrence." Id. at 694. This Essay agrees with
much of their analysis, but doubts that private enforcers will be motivated to pursue cases
under an agent liability system involving inherently smaller damages (and thus smaller
attorneys' fees). Thus, a combined or hybrid system of agent and enterprise liability (with
the agent's liability being increased and the enterprise's liability being decreased) seems
likely to better deter securities fraud. Also, some of their critique of enterprise liability now
seems dated. For example, they argue that monitoring by the corporation of its managers
will not work well because of the board's limited capacity and incentives to monitor its
structural bias, and the ability of managers to conceal their self-interested actions. See id.
at 710-12, 715-16. But their analysis, written over a decade ago, may underestimate the
monitoring capacity of the modern board and its gatekeepers. Particularly in light of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, independent audit committees are in a position to monitor for abuses,
such as premature revenue recognition, and thus enterprise liability cannot be as easily
dismissed as a futile strategy today in the manner that Arlen and Carney did in their article
fifteen years ago. In addition, they give little attention to the possibility that enterprise
liability coupled with incentive contracting between the enterprise and its agent can
produce superior deterrence to a simple rule of agent liability. See Sykes, supra note 75, at
577-78. Professor Sykes concludes that enterprise liability is generally superior whenever
the use of incentive devices can reduce the probability of the wrong. Id. In an era when
stock options are the basic currency of senior executive compensation, such incentive
contracting is certainly possible. Thus, enterprise liability probably works to a considerable
degree, but at high cost to shareholders. A hybrid system that combines agent liability with
enterprise liability should reduce those costs.
104. As noted earlier, the CEO of Global Crossing sold over $734 million in his
company's stock, and Enron executives were in a position to profit similarly by hiding
Enron's problems. See supra note 78.
105. Research shows that the actual fee award in securities class actions during the
1990s was approximately 32% of the recovery. See Martin et al., supra note 37, at 141.
More recent research finds somewhat lower percentages today (possibly because of the
impact of the lead plaintiff) and that the fee award is a declining percentage of the
recovery. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
securities class actions are now common, and thus the plaintiffs attorney
is motivated to bring and pursue securities class actions by the prospect of
receiving a sizable percentage of such a recovery. But if we reduce the
damages significantly, we correspondingly reduce the plaintiffs attor-
ney's expected recovery and thus the incentive to seek out and prosecute
securities fraud. For example, a $10 million civil penalty would probably
notjustify the costs, expenses, and risks that the plaintiffs attorney today
incurs to prosecute a securities class action' 0 6-even if the civil penalty
went exclusively to the plaintiffs' attorneys who brought the action
(which seems politically unacceptable in any event). 10 7 Moreover, low
penalty levels would encourage defendants to stretch out the litigation
interminably and wage a war of attrition in order to erode the expected
value of the payoff to the plaintiffs attorney.
In short, although a system of managerial liability seems likely to
yield greater deterrence than enterprise liability, one cannot safely elimi-
nate corporate liability in securities class actions without radically reduc-
ing the likelihood of private enforcement. As noted earlier, the federal
securities laws rely on private enforcement (even if its effectiveness may
often seem questionable).' 08 Thus, the most sensible policy approach is
an incremental and substitutionary one: to seek to shift the incidence of
the liability so that it falls more substantially on managers and other insid-
ers, but not to abolish corporate liability, which would continue to play a
residual role. Shaky as the case for corporate liability may be, economic
theory suggests that vicarious liability is efficient so long as the principal
and agent can enter into contracts that reduce the probability of the
wrong that is to be deterred. 10 9 Even given the "final period" problem,
there are conceivable means by which the corporation could write such
contracts with its managers, for example, by restricting stock options and
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1J. Empirical Legal Stud. 27, 50-54 (2004). Thus, as the
recovery surpasses the $100 million level, the 32% figure for the average fee award may be
an overstatement. Hence, this Essay uses the more conservative estimate of 25% in its
illustration.
106. Over a decade ago, Professor Alexander suggested that market losses of over $20
million appeared to be necessary to elicit a securities class action. Alexander, Merits, supra
note 24, at 511-13. While this estimate was challenged at the time because of her small
sample of cases, the combined impact of both the PSLRA and inflation over the
subsequent interval has probably made this estimate overly conservative today.
107. Although the public may accept the payment of attorneys' fees to the private
enforcer in the field of environmental regulation, the idea of paying the entire penalty to
the plaintiffs' attorneys is far more radical. Payment of a $25 to $50 million penalty to a
law firm in a securities case would likely shock the public (even though such a payment no
more than matches the attorneys' fees paid in many securities class actions today). Even
more importantly, political and judicial distaste for awarding such a penalty to a bounty-
hunting law firm might cripple enforcement.
108. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
109. See Sykes, supra note 75, at 577-78.
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other incentive compensation. 10 That they have done so only to a mod-
est degree to date probably evidences the inherent problems in inducing
the principal to monitor its agents in this context.
A deeper question also lurks here that this Essay will not attempt to
resolve: How much deterrence is needed? The simplest answer is that
modest penalties will produce little, if any, deterrence because private
enforcement will be nonexistent unless the expected recovery to the pri-
vate enforcer will exceed its expected costs and yield a return commensu-
rate with the risk assumed.I1 1 But this is only the first step. To achieve
deterrence, the expected penalty must also cancel out the expected gain
to the wrongdoer, who may often face a low probability of detection. But
even this further step may still be insufficient because the private en-
forcer may not be motivated to search diligently enough to detect hidden
violations. Thus, some economists argue that to truly deter, the expected
penalty should equal the expected social harm.' 12 Yet, this in turn raises
even more perplexing questions: What is the overall social harm in secur-
ities fraud? How should it be measured?
Here, one school of thought tends to view the harm as simply the
loss to the victimized investors, whose loss is more or less counter-
balanced by the gains received by the usually equally innocent investors
on the other side of these transactions.' 13 But this is overly narrow and
myopic accounting. The deeper problem in securities fraud is the impact
of fraud on investor confidence and thus the cost of equity capital. Here,
it is impossible to quantify the impact of any individual scandal, but
clearly the cumulative impact of Enron, WorldCom, and a host of other
scandals in the 2000 to 2002 era made stockholders wary, chilled the ini-
tial public offering market, and caused investors to demand a higher re-
turn based on the perceived higher risks-in short, the cost of capital
rose. When the cost of capital rises, the economy as a whole suffers, as
Gross National Product declines or stagnates, and unemployment may
increase. As a result, not only investors, but also citizens throughout soci-
ety experience a loss. In addition, fundamental misallocations of re-
sources may result because of what might best be termed a "contagion
effect." That is, companies in the same industry may feel compelled to
110. For example, if the driving force behind managerial financial misconduct is
stock options, as many believe, the corporation could substitute restricted stock contracts
under which the manager would not be able to sell for an extended period-thus
preventing a simple bailout. There has been some modest movement in this direction
since Enron, and the securities class action could have been one of the forces driving the
corporation marginally in this direction.
111. "Expected recovery" here means the civil penalty discounted by the action's
likelihood of success. Thus, if the penalty is $1 million, and the odds are 50/50, the
expected recovery is $500,000.
112. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J.
Pol. Econ. 169, 170, 180 (1968).




copy the accounting tricks of an industry leader, lest their stock price fall
far behind and they become a takeover target. Other firms may simply
abandon a market or industry in the belief that they cannot effectively
compete with the seemingly dominant competitor (who is in fact using
crooked accounting). Considerable evidence suggests that Enron and
WorldCom had this impact on other firms within their respective
industries.
l1 4
Given this possibility of broader social harm and economic misalloca-
tion, the radical reform of abolishing corporate liability for secondary
market securities fraud seems an overly risky step, but the cost of enter-
prise liability to shareholders can be reduced by shifting the incidence of
damages to agent/managers, while leaving the corporation liable for the
residual amount.
III. WHv DON'T INSIDERS PAY MORE?
One cannot shift the incidence of the damages in securities class ac-
tions without first better understanding why these costs today fall so heav-
ily on the issuer corporation. Here, the basic story involves the combina-
tion of agency costs, the legal rules regarding indemnification, and
recent changes in insurance practices.
A. Agency Costs
When corporate executives are sued alongside the corporation as co-
defendants in securities litigation (as they almost always are'15), a clear
conflict of interest arises: The executives will naturally want to settle their
own liability with funds advanced by the corporation. In principle, the
board should recognize the conflict of interest inherent here, but boards
of directors have little capacity (and perhaps even less incentive) to moni-
114. For example, AT&T appears to have responded to the accounting manipulations
practiced by WorldCom, including its artificially low ratio of line costs to revenues, by
deciding to abandon the field on the false premise that it could not compete effectively
with WorldCom. Initially, it laid off "tens of thousands [of workers] in the late 1990s as it
tried frantically to match WorldCom's infuriatingly low costs." Geoffrey Colvin, The Other
Victims of Bernie Ebbers's Fraud, Fortune, Aug. 8, 2005, at 32, 32; see also John J. Keller,
AT&T's Armstrong Is Expected to Cut as Much as 15% of Staff, Wall St.J.,Jan. 22, 1998, at
A3 (noting that 19,000 appeared likely to be laid off in order to match "lean trend setters
such as WorldCom, Inc."). Unlike AT&T, Qwest and Global Crossing appear to have
emulated WorldCom's accounting fraud, and the latter went into bankruptcy. Colvin,
supra, at 32. Ultimately, in 2000, AT&T split itself into four separate businesses based
partly on its mistaken belief that it could not compete with WorldCom in the long distance
business. See Adam Cohen, Ma Bell Calls It Splits, Time, Nov. 6, 2000, at 96, 96-97.
Similarly, Dynegy appears to have copied many of Enron's accounting tricks and as a result
entered into a major settlement with the SEC and class action plaintiffs. For a description
of Dynegy's structured finance transactions, see Nathan Koppel, Wearing Blinders, Am.
Law., July 1, 2004, at 75, 78-79; see also United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 549 (5th Cir.
2005) (affirming securities fraud conviction of Dynegy executive with respect to these
transactions).
115. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
1566 [Vol. 106:1534
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION REFORM
tor the complex details and complicated procedures of securities litiga-
tion. Even more importantly, the directors may themselves also be sued.
Or, they may have been sued in the past, giving them a closer identifica-
tion with the interests of the officer-defendants than with those of the
shareholders. "Structural bias" is always a possible explanation for lax
monitoring, but seldom is it more legitimately applicable than in the con-
text of litigation against corporate officials, which seems to trigger a
"circle-the-wagons" defensive response from directors eager to protect
their colleagues in management.
Also, if the settlement is fully covered by the corporation's own liabil-
ity insurance (as it usually is1'6), the board has little reason to resist a
settlement that involves no contribution by the individual defendants.
Even if the settlement were to require individual defendants to pay some
amount out of their own funds, corporate counsel might still advise the
board that the corporation was legally required to indemnify its officers
and employees under its bylaws.1 17 If so, it can be plausibly argued that
requiring the individual defendants to contribute would only produce a
pointless circularity. If this advice is accepted (as it normally appears to
be), the net result is both that the corporation bears virtually the entire
cost of the settlement and that actual indemnification is seldom paid be-
cause few payments by individual defendants are ever made.
B. Indemnification and the Settlement Approval Process
Although state corporate law broadly authorizes indemnification of
corporate officials, the SEC partially withdraws that protection by pre-
cluding indemnification of liabilities arising under the federal securities
laws.' 18 But the practical impact of the SEC's position has been modest.
116. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
117. As discussed below, this conclusion is not necessarily correct, even if all the other
defendants settle. See infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text. Also, it would be
clearly incorrect if the manager-defendants went to trial and were held liable. See infra
notes 118-119 and accompanying text. Counsel can still argue, however, that, if the
corporation wants a settlement and an end to the controversy, it may be necessary to pay
the settlement costs of officers and defendants because the plaintiff may want a global
settlement, and the corporation will likely want an end to the adverse publicity and
disruption.
118. The leading decision is Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276,
1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969), which found that actual knowledge by a corporate official of
material misstatements barred recovery because indemnification would be contrary to
public policy, given the deterrent purposes of the federal securities laws. Later cases have
said that even liability based on recklessness may not be indemnified. See, e.g., Heizer
Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979). Indeed, "mere negligence" on the part of
an underwriter, which is actionable under sections 11 and 12 (a) (2) of the Securities Act of
1933, has been held to bar indemnification under this deterrent rationale. See
Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1995); First Golden Bancorporation
v. Weiszmann, 942 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding indemnification barred even
under strict liability provisions of Section 16(b)); Stewart v. Am. Oil & Gas, 845 F.2d 196,
200 (9th Cir. 1988). The SEC enforces this position by requiring companies seeking to
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Although courts have largely accepted the SEC's position that indemnifi-
cation of securities law liabilities is inconsistent with the policies underly-
ing the federal securities laws, neither courts nor the SEC have extended
this policy to apply to settlement payments or defense costs where the
defendants do not admit liability.1 19 The result is to create powerful pres-
sures to settle in order that the individual defendants can escape any risk
of personal liability.
Equally important, federal courts have repeatedly held that they have
no responsibility for supervising how the multiple defendants in a securi-
ties class action apportion liability among themselves, so long as the ag-
gregate settlement is fair to the class. 120 An illustrative case is In re
Cendant Corp. Litigation, which, at the time it settled, was the largest class
action settlement on record 121-but also one in which the entire $2.85
billion settlement came from the defendant corporation. No contribu-
tions were made by Cendant's defendant officers and directors, even
though numerous officers and directors received releases from all claims
under the settlement. Understandably, a shareholder objected to this set-
tlement, pointing out that thirteen out of the fourteen Cendant directors
had been sued in the action and yet none had made any contribution to
the settlement. 122 On this basis, the objector claimed that the settlement
amounted to an illegal indemnification of the individual defendants.
The district court dismissed these claims and was upheld by the Third
Circuit, 12 3 which agreed that (1) the district court need only be con-
cerned as to whether the settlement was adequate and reasonable to the
class, 124 and (2) the settlement did not amount to indemnification be-
cause no reimbursement was made by the corporation to its directors.
125
As a practical matter then, indemnification of securities liabilities is both
register their securities to give an undertaking that if a director seeks indemnification for
damages, the company "will ... submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question
whether such indemnification . . . is against public policy as expressed in the Act." 17
C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3) (2006). But this language requires court approval only for
indemnification of damages, not settlements.
119. See, e.g., Raychem Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1177 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Pepsico, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The SEC's
position is most clearly set forth in Regulation S-K in Item 510, and there it is stated to
apply only to damages. 17 C.F.R. § 229.510.
120. See, e.g., In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986).
121. 264 F.3d 286, 288, 291 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that Cendant paid $2,851,500,000,
and Ernst & Young, its auditor, paid $335,000,000, for a grand total of just over $3.186
billion).
122. Id. at 291-92.
123. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (D.N.J. 2000), afFd, 264
F.3d 286 (rejecting objection filed by Martin Deutch).
124. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 293-96 (holding claims that contributions made by
individual defendants were inadequate should be resolved in derivative action filed in
Delaware).
125. Id. at 301.
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possible and common, so long as it is done with the appropriate cosmetic
subterfuge.
C. D&O Insurance
The latest relevant development involves a change in the coverage of
D&O insurance. Traditionally, public companies insured their directors,
paying the premiums on their D&O policies. 126 This closed a hole that
indemnification left open, because indemnification is not available in
bankruptcy and certain other contexts. 12 7 Over time, corporations also
came to insure their own obligation to pay indemnification, but they did
not insure their own direct liability as defendants. Typically, the two poli-
cies were written in tandem by the insurance company because the in-
surer knew it would not have to pay twice and could thus sell the joint
policies at a cheaper rate.'
28
But a problem in coverage still remained. Insurers writing D&O pol-
icies would resist paying the entire defense costs in a securities class ac-
tion where the corporation was also an uninsured defendant and would
demand an allocation of the defense costs between their clients and the
corporation. 129 Barring such an allocation agreement, they would
threaten not to pay any expenses, thereby placing the individual defend-
ants at risk for these payments.
126. For concise histories of the law on corporate indemnification of officers and
directors, see United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 353-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Joseph
Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and
Officers, 33 Bus. Law. 1993, 1994-96 (1978).
127. In bankruptcy, any executory obligation, such as the contractual obligation to
pay indemnification, can be rejected. As a practical matter, directors rely on their
individual insurance policies only when the corporation becomes insolvent. See Baker &
Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 38 (manuscript at 11). Otherwise, all payments are
made by the insurer under its other policies. See infra notes 128-129. Another problem
with traditional indemnification was that the obligation to pay indemnification arose only
"after the defense to [the] legal proceedings ha[d] been 'successful on the merits or
otherwise.'" Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005). This left open the
question of advances of legal expenses.
128. Most D&O policies came to include two basic types of insurance coverage: "Side
A" coverage, which protected the individual officers and directors against covered losses,
and "Side B" coverage, which insured the corporation itself from losses resulting from its
indemnification obligations. See Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 38
(manuscript at 10-11).
129. Because they were not insuring the corporation for its own liability, the insurers
did not want to pick up the portion of the defense effort attributable to the corporation's
defense. For an example of such a dispute, see Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54
F.3d 1424, 1431-36 (9th Cir. 1995). Also, if there were another defendant, such as an
auditor, investment bank, or law firm, an allocation would again obviously be necessary.
Alternatively, some officers or directors might be insured by a different insurance
company, again causing the insurance company representing the company to want an
allocation of expenses. See Ernest Martin, Jr., D&O Insurance Coverage: Surviving the
Turmoil (Lessons We Are Learning from Enron) 2-3 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://www.haynesboone.com/FILES/tbl_
sl2PublicationsHotTopics/PublicationPDF60/835/09042002_Martinl .pdf.
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To end these uncertainties, insurers began to write "corporate entity
coverage," which directly reimbursed the corporation for its own litiga-
tion expenses, its own settlement payments in securities cases, and certain
other forms of litigation. 130 This form of insurance appears to have first
been offered in 1996, and thus is a relatively new development.1 3 1 De-
spite its recent appearance, entity insurance caught on quickly, and over
90% of D&O insureds reported having entity coverage as of 2002.132 In
the wake of its appearance, D&O insurance now protects both the indi-
vidual's assets and those of the corporation. As a result, allocation seem-
ingly became unnecessary, because one insurer covered the exposure of
virtually everyone. If the insurer had an overall policy limit of, say, $50
million on all three coverages (the individual's policy, the corporate in-
demnification policy, and the corporation's own coverage), it could sim-
ply write a single check, and neither it nor the corporation needed to
allocate the payment among the three policies.
D. Analysis
The combination of these three developments means that the pro-
cess has been simplified so that all costs typically flow back to a single
insurance company-until its policy limit is exceeded. But, as a result,
the deterrent value of the securities class action has again been eclipsed.
In addition, the sharp disparity between the corporation's ability to in-
demnify settlement costs, and its inability to indemnify judgments estab-
lished at trial in securities class actions, places overwhelming pressure on
defendants to settle. This in turn may invite frivolous, or at least, low
merit, litigation. Finally, with the advent of entity insurance, the corpora-
tion has much less incentive than in the past to resist the plaintiff-if it
can settle within the policy's limits. In the past, it shared liability with the
individual defendants, and its own exposure was reduced if the individual
defendants (or their insurers) contributed to the settlement fund. To-
day, it is rationally indifferent to the allocation because its insurance cov-
ers everything. 1
33
130. See Martin, supra note 129, at 2-3. In the industry parlance, this is known as
"Side C" coverage, as it insures the corporation's own direct liability, not its liability to
officers or directors. See Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 38 (manuscript at
10-11).
131. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement
Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 413, 443 (2004).
132. See Michael W. Early, Another Glimpse into the Current State of Directors and
Officers Insurance, (ABA Section on Litig., Comm. on Corp. Counsel), Summer 2003, at
29 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This was up from just over 50% in 1997. Id.
133. This can be viewed as a classic "moral hazard" problem, as the availability of
insurance reduces the corporation's otherwise rational desire to shift some of the liability
to others (such as responsible officers). Of course, its future insurance premiums will rise
if it incurs recurrent litigation or settles too generously, but these payments appear to be
either too small or too invisible to motivate managers. To economists, the real puzzle is
not the ex post behavior of a corporation that has insurance, but the reasoning that leads
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What can be done to restore that deterrent role? The most obvious
solution might be to preclude the indemnification of settlement costs in
securities class actions. But, absent legislation, the doctrinal obstacles to
this position are immense. If the SEC took the position that the federal
securities laws barred indemnification of settlement costs, it would likely
be stretching its own uncertain authority to preclude indemnification be-
yond the breaking point. At a time when Supreme Court decisions regu-
larly show a fervent concern for the preservation of federalism and states'
powers, 134 any attempt by the SEC to encroach through rulemaking on
the traditional powers of the states to regulate corporate governance in-
vites strong judicial resistance.' 35 Precisely because a right to indemnifi-
cation is clearly established under state law and because courts to date
have not seen the indemnification of settlement costs to conflict with the
policies underlying the federal securities laws, a new SEC initiative seek-
ing to bar indemnification of settlement costs would appear highly vul-
nerable. This does not mean that the SEC is powerless, but it may have to
proceed by requiring greater disclosure about the settlement process,
rather than by framing a broader prophylactic rule.
The better hope therefore lies in encouraging greater judicial scru-
tiny of the settlement allocation in securities class actions. Although, in
the relatively few decisions on point, courts have so far been unwilling to
supervise the apportionment of liability among the defendants in a secur-
ities class action, the case for greater scrutiny is strong. Second Circuit
Judge Jon 0. Newman wrote a powerful concurring opinion in In re
Warner Communications, arguing that occasions can arise in which such a
review is justified.' 3 6 In that case, he first noted the importance of a fair
apportionment of liability to the plaintiffs in a securities class action who
remained shareholders:
Every dollar contributed to the settlement by the individual
defendants is a dollar of gain to appellant and those in his cir-
corporations to insure themselves, as opposed to only their agents. See Baker & Griffith,
Missing Monitor, supra note 38 (manuscript at 30-46).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (invalidating
federal civil remedy of Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Commerce Clause
power); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79-82 (2000) (invalidating Congress's
abrogation of states' sovereign immunity under Age Discrimination in Employment Act as
exceeding Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
918-22 (1997) (invalidating Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act provisions requiring
local "chief law enforcement officers" to conduct background checks as violating dual
sovereignty of federal and state governments); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
552-53, 564 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act as exceeding Congress's
Commerce Clause power).
135. Indeed, the SEC has been repeatedly rebuffed in this context. See Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (vacating SEC's one-share, one-vote
rule as in excess of SEC's authority because subject matter was entrusted to state
regulation).




cumstances. Every dollar contributed by the corporate defend-
ants is partially offset by the pro rata decrease in the value of
appellant's stock due to the payment.
13 7
On this basis, he opined that an overly generous corporate contribu-
tion could imply an unfair settlement:
[I] n a case such as this, where the apportionment between
corporate and individual defendants can have economic signifi-
cance for a shareholder-claimant, some scrutiny of the portion
contributed by a corporate defendant normally would be appro-
priate. In such circumstances, a settlement might well be shown
to be unreasonable to a shareholder if the corporate defendant
contributed so much more than a fair share as to cause a dis-
cernible incremental pro rata decline in the value of the share-
holder's stock below the reduction attributable to a fair
contribution. 138
In the contemporary environment where individual defendants
make no contribution and the corporation bears the entire burden,
Judge Newman's concerns about the settlement's fairness seem increas-
ingly well placed. 13 9 But the question remains: How does one induce
courts to consider an issue that they seem to prefer to duck? Part LV will
approach this question.
IV. A ROADMAP TO DETERRENCE: How TO GET THERE FROM HERE
Based on the premise that the securities class action can serve an
important deterrent role, but only a minor compensatory role, this Essay
has favored a policy of greater managerial liability. The persons most
responsible for the accounting irregularities at Enron, WorldCom, and a
host of other companies were managers who, beginning in the 1990s,
began to be primarily compensated with equity compensation and so had
a strong incentive to recognize income prematurely in order to inflate
reported income. 1 40 More than any other factor, this sudden shift in ex-
ecutive compensation from cash to equity best explains the hyperbolic
137. Id.
138. Id. Judge Newman went on to note that this condition was not present in In re
Warner Communications because the Delaware Chancery Court had specifically determined
that the allocation between the corporate and individual defendants was fair. Id.
139. Also, the rare fact present in In re Warner Communications and emphasized by
Judge Newman, that a state court had approved the liability apportionment as fair, will not
normally provide a basis for avoiding this issue.
140. Between 1990 and 2001, the percentage of the total compensation of a chief
executive officer of a large public corporation in the United States that was paid in the
form of equity (rather than cash) rose from 8% to 66%. Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in
Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 21, 23 fig.1 (2003). For a fuller
discussion of the destabilizing impact of this rapid shift from cash to equity compensation,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of
the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 275-78 (2004).
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increase in accounting restatements that began in the mid 1990s.141
Thus, corporate managers, facing enhanced incentives to engage in
fraudulent reporting, are the key actors who most need to be deterred.
But how does one get there from here? This section will begin with
the case of a securities fraud action that proceeds to trial and results in a
finding of liability, and then will work back to the more common case of
settlements.
A. Applying Proportionate Liability to the Corporate Defendant
Assume that a jury finds a hypothetical corporate issuer and various
individual defendants liable for securities fraud in the amount of $500
million. What happens next? Under section 21D(f) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,142 which establishes a rule of proportionate liability,
the factfinder (judge or jury) must now apportion liability among the
"covered persons" (a term that covers all the defendants in a securities
class action) 14 3 and assign each defendant that "portion of the judgment
that corresponds to the percentage of responsibility of that covered per-
son."1 44 In other words, the factfinder must allocate the judgment
among all defendants (and any nondefendants it also considers responsi-
ble) based on their relative culpability, with all the percentages so as-
signed adding up to 100%. This was the PSLRA's innovation in order to
reduce the coercive effect of the former system of 'joint and several" lia-
bility upon secondary defendants. It was intended to protect auditors,
investment bankers, and law firms-all of whom might have only margi-
nal culpability but could end up being held jointly and severally liable for
the entire judgment (which amount would clearly be imposed on them
alone if the principal defendants were insolvent). Under the PSLRA,
'joint and several" liability can only be imposed on a defendant if it has
"knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws,"'145 and this term
is defined rigorously so as to preclude a merely "reckless" defendant from
being subjected to 'Joint and several liability."
1 46
Presumably, in the normal case, the jury will hear evidence and then
answer "special interrogatories" as to the relative culpability of each de-
fendant.1 4 7 But what "percentage of responsibility" should apply to the
141. Coffee, supra note 140, at 282-83; see also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-
03-138, Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses
and Remaining Challenges 15 (2002) (showing increase from ninety-two restatements in
1997 to an estimated 250 in 2002).
142. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(f) (2000).
143. Id. § 21D(f) (10) (C).
144. Id. § 21D(f) (2) (B) (i).
145. Id. § 21D(f) (2) (A).
146. Id. § 21D(f) (10) (A)-(B) (requiring that defendant have "actual knowledge that,
as a result of the omission, one of the material representations of the covered person is
false").
147. Section 21D(f)(3)(A) requires the jury to be instructed to "answer special
interrogatories" as to the "percentage of responsibility" to be assigned to each person
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corporate issuer? The PSLRA gives little guidance on this question be-
cause its real concern was protecting secondary defendants, such as the
accounting firms that lobbied hard for passage of this provision. Argu-
ably, the defendant corporation should not be seen as having "actual
knowledge" of the omission (as section 21D(f) requires1 48 ) because it can
only have vicarious knowledge through its officers and agents. In deter-
mining the corporation's "percentage of responsibility" under section
21D(f), it should also be relevant that the corporate officials who perpe-
trated the fraud may have concealed it from their superiors and the cor-
poration's audit committee because they were pursuing personal ends
(i.e., the maximization of the current value of their stock options and
other equity compensation).
Thus, it is realistic to expect that the factfinder (judge orjury) might
often assign the highest percentage of responsibility to a corporation's
chief executive officer and/or chief financial officer, with only lesser per-
centages being assigned to the corporation and the other secondary de-
fendants. Once such liability is imposed, the corporation cannot then
indemnify these amounts because this would directly offend Globus and
the other decisions restricting indemnification of securities law liabili-
ties.1 49 Moreover, in this rare case of ajury verdict, even the defendant's
insurance may be unavailable because customarily the policy includes an
"actual fraud" exclusion to the insurer's liability.1 50
Alternatively, the factfinder might find that the CEO, CFO, and the
corporation each had "actual knowledge" of the material omissions or
misstatements and so are jointly and severally liable. Here, where both
alleged to have "caused or contributed to the loss incurred by the plaintiff." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(f)(3)(A). Section 21D(f) (3) (C) ("Factors for Consideration") instructs the
factfinder as to the criteria to be employed in assessing culpability. Id. § 78u-4(f) (3) (C).
These factors can only be awkwardly applied to the corporation, because almost by
definition, it made the statement that misinformed the market.
148. See § 21D (f) (10) (A).
149. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
150. The issue here will be whether there has been a "final adjudication" that satisfied
the "actual fraud" language of the typical exclusion, as Rule 10b-5 liability can be based
simply on "recklessness," which may arguably be a level below "actual fraud." See
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (defining
.reckless conduct" as "highly unreasonable" and involving "an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care"). Most D&O policies contain an exclusion for "actual fraud" or
personal enrichment, but subject this exclusion to a "final adjudication" condition that
obligates the insurer to fund the insured's defense until there is a final adjudication that
the officer committed fraud. See Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 38
(manuscript at 16); see also Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 794 (3d Cir. 1987)
(finding that insurer must "pay loss as the insured incurs legal obligation for such loss,"
with promise of recompense if court rules that insured "engaged in active and deliberate
dishonesty"). Because plaintiffs need to resort to the insurance, they will predictably try to
avoid triggering this exclusion and will seek to characterize the defendant as "reckless" but
not involved in "actual fraud." Nonetheless, it is the court that frames this interrogatory
(although it too has weak incentives to force a "final adjudication" that would render resort
to insurance unavailable).
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these individuals and the corporation are held 100% liable, it would
again seem to offend and frustrate section 21D(f)'s concept of propor-
tionate liability if the corporation paid the entire liability without any con-
tribution from the other defendants (even though no indemnification
would be technically paid). 15 1 In such a case the court should recognize
its responsibility under the PSLRA to assure itself that the apportionment
of liability did not offend section 21D(f)'s directions that actual liability
be allocated on the basis of relative culpability. To this extent, the old
rule of nonreview of apportionment should yield to the PSLRA's explicit
policy.
B. Extending Proportionate Liability to the Settlement Context
In a settlement, no such apportionment of liability by the factfinder
occurs, and thus it is harder to claim that a corporate payment of the
entire settlement offends the PSLRA's proportionate liability provision.
But this defines the problem that needs to be addressed. Given the obvi-
ous conflict of interest when the corporation and its senior executives or
directors are sued in the same action, the SEC could require that inde-
pendent directors examine any proposed settlement of a securities class
action and evaluate its fairness to the corporation, just as they would nor-
mally do in the standard self-dealing context. Specifically, these directors
should be expected to assess the apportionment of liability among the
corporation and its officers and explain in a public statement if and why
they consider it to be fair to the corporation. This is a disclosure strategy,
rather than a prophylactic rule, and it seems much more clearly within
the SEC's jurisdiction than does a ban on indemnification of settlement
expenses. This approach of mandating a fairness evaluation and explana-
tion by independent directors has long been used by the SEC in related
contexts involving sensitive self-dealing (such as "going-private" transac-
tions). 15 2 By analogy, the independent directors would be required to
state their belief that the apportionment was fair or unfair to the share-
holders and to discuss in reasonable detail the "material factors upon
151. Such a finding might, however, amount to a "final adjudication" that the director
or officer engaged in actual fraud and so was not covered under his or her D&O policy,
which typically contains an exclusion for actual fraud. See Baker & Griffith, Missing
Monitor, supra note 38 (manuscript at 8-9).
152. For example, in a "going-private" transaction, a public corporation must comply
with Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2006), and file a Schedule 13e-3, id. § 240.13e-100.
Item 8 of that schedule requires the issuer to evaluate the fairness of the proposed
transaction and furnish the information required by Item 1014 of Regulation M-A, id.
§ 229.1014. In turn, Item 1014 requires a statement as to why the person filing the
schedule "believes that the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security
holders." Id. § 229.1014(a). This disclosure must then be followed by a discussion "in




which the belief ... is based."' 53 Experience in the related contexts
where the SEC has used such a technique suggests that it does have real
impact-possibly because independent directors tend to be risk averse.
Today, of course, no disclosure is mandated by SEC rules upon the
settlement of a securities class action, but there is no apparent reason why
this context should be ignored by the SEC, particularly when disclosure
of the position and analysis of independent directors is required in the
case of other conflict of interest transactions. The simplest way to imple-
ment such a requirement would be for the SEC to add a new triggering
event to the already lengthy list of events that require an issuer to file a
Current Report on Form 8-K-'5 4 namely, the entry into a settlement of a
securities class action (either by the corporation or any of its present or
former officers or directors) under which the corporation is to make any
financial payment.
Of course, some replies to such a disclosure obligation are predict-
able. The directors might, for example, respond that the corporation
had no alternative because corporate bylaws required indemnification of
settlement costs. But this is an overbroad statement of the law. For exam-
ple, Delaware law provides that a corporation may indemnify any person
who is sued in his or her capacity as "a director, officer, employee or
agent of the corporation... against ... amounts paid in settlement... in
connection with such action ...if the person acted in good faith and in a
manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of
the corporation."1 55 The Delaware statute further provides that any such
indemnification shall be made only "upon a determination that indemni-
fication of the present or former director, officer, employee or agent is
proper in the circumstances because the person has met the applicable
standard of conduct.1 56 In effect, the board must specifically determine
that the party to be indemnified "acted in good faith and in a manner the
person reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of
the corporation.
157
In light of this requirement that there be a specific determination as
to the propriety of the defendant officer's or director's conduct, this pro-
153. This disclosure would simply parallel the disclosure now required by Item 1014
of Regulation M-A. See id. § 229.1014(a)-(b). That regulation goes even further and also
requires an analysis of "the weight assigned to each factor." Id. § 229.1014(b).
154. Form 8-K is the SEC-mandated form for current reports under section 13 or 15d
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. A host of events, including even amendments to
the corporation's bylaws, today require the filing of a Form 8-K. Procedurally, the Form
8-K should be filed before the judicial approval of such a settlement, and thus the
articulation of this requirement should require its filing after an agreement in principle is
reached, but before the settlement is submitted to the court. Ideally, the SEC might
comment on these disclosures to the court in an amicus curiae filing.
155. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
156. See id. § 145(d). Subsection (d) specifically cross references the standard of
conduct set forth in section 145(a) and quoted supra text accompanying note 155.
157. Id. § 145(a).
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posal that the SEC require disclosure by the directors of their evaluation,
along with the reason underlying their decision, creates no conflict be-
tween federal and state law. Indeed, the two requirements dovetail, as
Delaware law seems already to require a determination that the party to
be indemnified acted "in good faith," and the required federal disclosure
would simply focus in detail on how the board reached that judgment.
As a practical matter, however, such a disclosure requirement might
dissuade many independent boards from approving complete assump-
tion by the corporation of settlement costs where officers or directors are
also sued. After all, if the settlement were for $500 million and plaintiffs
alleged that the corporation inflated its earnings to maximize its short-
term stock price, then independent directors are placed in a ticklish posi-
tion. They cannot easily claim that they paid $500 million to settle a frivo-
lous action or simply to avoid disruption of normal business activities.
Also, the SEC is experienced at contesting makeweight or boilerplate jus-
tifications, and it can demand more detailed explanations. Finally, the
directors risk liability themselves if they file an incomplete or misleading
Form 8-K with the SEC. 158
The net result should be that independent directors will be embar-
rassed into requiring greater fairness in securities class action settlements.
Even if federal courts continue to resist assuming responsibility for the
apportionment of liability among defendants, they can still use the SEC
mandated disclosure as a basis for making further inquiry. Nor should it
be assumed that all federal courts will resist consideration of the appor-
tionment of liability. Judge Newman's position in In re Warner Communi-
cations is convincing. 1 59 Once a formal corporate evaluation of the ap-
portionment is prepared by the board, objectors to the settlement can
bring it to the attention of the court.
A predictable response to this proposal will be that it ignores the role
of insurance. Even if indemnification were restrained and the corpora-
tion itself did not pick up the entire settlement cost, those costs will still
be covered by D&O insurance paid for by the corporation (and thus its
shareholders indirectly). This objection has some merit, but it ignores
some important contemporary facts.
First, officers and directors today often face liabilities that exceed
their insurance coverage. WorldCom is an illustration of this pattern
60
because no corporation can ever afford to insure its officers and directors
against the billions in potential liabilities that the WorldCom directors
158. Although private plaintiffs would be unlikely to sue because the damages would
generally be modest, the SEC could itself sue with regard to any false or misleading
statement made in a document filed with it. If the Commission sued under section
17(a) (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2000), it would not need to prove
scienter. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1980).
159. See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
160. The WorldCom directors paid some $25 million, or 20% of their net worth each,
to settle their liability in that case. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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faced. 16 1 Today, D&O insurance coverage depends typically on the cor-
poration's market capitalization. Coverage limits in 2004 ranged from
$4.7 million (for corporations with a market capitalization of up to $100
million) to $122.9 million (for corporations with a market capitalization
of over $5 billion).' 62 Currently, insurers will not offer insurance any-
where near the billion dollar range; reputedly, the highest coverage now
being offered is $300 million.' 63 On this basis, officers at a number of
companies are subject to potential exposure, particularly if their com-
pany files for bankruptcy. Second, insurance coverage has limitations on
the conduct covered and can be rescinded if fraudulent statements were
made in the original application. 164 Typically, when the corporation ap-
plies for D&O insurance, the insurer asks the corporation to attach its
financial statements to the application, and if these financial statements
are overstated, the insurer has at least a colorable basis for denying cover-
161. As noted earlier, a significant number of recent settlements have exceeded the
issuer's insurance resources. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
162. See D&O Coverage, Controller's Rep., Feb. 2005, at 9, 9. For the year 2004, this
publication reports, relying on a survey by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, that the coverage
limits for the typical for-profit corporation were as follows:
Average Coverage Limits by Asset Size
Up to $100 million: $4.7 million
$100 million - $400 million: $16.3 million
$400 million - $1 billion: $25.4 million
$1 billion - $2 billion: $34.3 million
$2 billion - $5 billion: $58.6 million
Over $5 billion: $122.9 million
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin also reported that the average for-profit U.S. corporation in-
creased its coverage limits in 2005 to $14.3 million (up from $13.6 million in 2004). See
Dave Lenckus, Directors Study D&O Cover Limits to Protect Assets, Bus. Ins.,Jan. 30, 2006,
at 25.
163. See Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 38 (manuscript at 10) (citing
interviews with corporate risk managers and underwriters).
164. In the wake of recent corporate scandals, many insurers are increasingly
attempting to rescind their policies based on a claim that a fraudulent misrepresentation
was made to the insurance company in the application. State laws differ widely as to their
ability to deny coverage in this fashion. Under New York law, an insurer can rescind based
on a misrepresentation in the application without needing to show that the
misrepresentation was made with an intent to deceive the insurer. See Mut. Benefit Life
Ins. Co. v.JMR Elecs. Corp., 848 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1988); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Pascarella, 993 F. Supp. 134, 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). A number of other jurisdictions also
permit coverage to be rescinded based on an innocent misrepresentation so long as it was
material. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Sahlen, 999 F.2d 1532, 1536 (lth Cir. 1993);
First Nat'l Bank Holding Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 885 F. Supp. 1533, 1535 (N.D. Fla.
1995). In contrast, Texas law requires the misrepresentation to be made with an intent to
deceive in order for coverage to be denied. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088,
1092 (N.D. Tex. 1989); Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex.
1994).
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age to culpable insiders. 65 Hence, removing the corporation as the ulti-
mate backstop who will pay all settlement costs and expenses has real
world consequences and tends to ensure that enough liability will fall on
corporate officers to have some deterrent value.
A last objection to this proposal is that it will add to the litigation risk
associated with being an outside director. If so, then that would be a
deficiency. But it should not. Outside directors have virtually no
antifraud liability,1 66 and negligence on their part is only actionable
under the federal securities laws under section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933.167 Further, under the standard here proposed, little problem arises
with indemnification of settlement costs in an action based simply on
negligence. Under the above-quoted Delaware statute, a merely negli-
gent director can be found to have acted "in good faith and in a manner
[he] reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of
the corporation."'168 Thus, under the standard corporate bylaws, indem-
nification would be mandatory, and the board would have no difficulty
explaining its decision in a Form 8-K, as earlier proposed. Only in cases
where the insiders appear to have been actively engaged in misconduct,
such as by inflating revenues or hiding liabilities in their own interest, do
the board's obligations become more complex under existing law, and it
is in these cases that the proposed board explanation would mesh with
their obligation to determine if the "good faith" standard was satisfied.
What can be expected of this proposed reform? Clearly in cases
where the liability exceeds $100 million, individual defendants are not
likely-even collectively-to fund more than a low percentage of the total
settlement. But that is probably enough to deter. Moreover, the contem-
porary mean and median securities class action settlements are for much
165. See Martin, supra note 129, at 24-25. For examples of rescission on this basis,
see Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 999 F.2d at 1536; Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Towers
Fin. Corp., No. 94 Civ. 2727 (WK) (AJP), 1997 WL 906427, at *7-*8, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
12, 1997). Innocent outside directors may remain entitled to their coverage even when the
corporation makes a misrepresentation to the insurer in its application for D&O
insurance, but the law is divided on this point. For example, in INA Underwriters
Insurance Co. v. D.H. Forde & Co., 630 F. Supp. 76, 77 (W.D.N.Y. 1985), the entire policy
was declared void, even as to individuals who had not signed the application or committed
fraud. Where there is a severability clause, with the result that the D&O policy is to be
construed as a separate contract between each insured and the insurer, an innocent
insured will not lose coverage because of fraud committed by another. See Wedtech Corp.
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 214, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The bottom line here is that
culpable insiders may very well lose their insurance coverage in accounting fraud cases, but
outside directors are less at risk.
166. See Black et al., Director Liability, supra note 65, at 1075.
167. This was the basis for liability in the WorldCom case where outside directors paid
$18 million. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(c) (2000), makes every director liable for any material
misstatement or omission in the registration statement, unless the director can establish an
affirmative defense of "due diligence."
168. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text (quoting Delaware General
Corporation Law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001)).
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smaller amounts (currently around $27 million and $5.3 million, respec-
tively).169 In these cases, insiders could fund a significant proportion of
the settlement.
C. Activating the Insurer
The recent advent of entity coverage has created a crisis for many
D&O insurers, as securities class actions are now settling at higher levels
(at least in part because issuer defendants have less incentive to resist),
and the insurers who resist are facing a growing backlog of cases. 170 For
nearly every year since 1991, securities class action filings have outpaced
settlements, with the result that the D&O insurance industry faces the
"specter of the '1,000 claims' inventory" 17 1 -that is, a thousand or more
unresolved securities class actions. Against this backdrop, insurers have
more incentive to resist and deny coverage for fraud in the application.
But this does them little good if the corporate client will pay the
same amount under its own policy. Although today it is customary (and
probably cheaper) for one insurance company to cover both the individ-
ual officers and the corporation, the incentives would be quite different if
different insurers covered the individual defendants and the corporation.
This would create a greater likelihood of a fair allocation of the settle-
ment costs because each corporate insurer would now have a greater rea-
son in its own self-interest to resist an overly generous contribution by its
client. Also, the insurer insuring the individual defendants might be
more willing to seek to rescind its policies for fraud in the application in
the case of the insider defendants.1 72 Thus, based on the self-interest of
individual insurers, we get to the same end point as we would by insisting
that independent directors monitor the settlement: a fair allocation be-
tween the corporation and its officers. Again, the SEC probably lacks au-
thority to order this, but could encourage it through disclosure.
17 3
If the corporation were required to undertake a study of the respon-
sibility of its officers, conducted by independent counsel, to establish the
fairness of the allocation between the corporation and the individual de-
fendants, then the current practice of the corporation requiring the
169. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
170. See Early, supra note 132, at 27. This author is the assistant general counsel of
the Chicago Underwriting Group, Inc.
171. Id.
172. In the case of the culpable insiders, the insurer has a plausible case for
rescinding coverage based on fraud in the application. See supra notes 164-165 and
accompanying text. Where the insurer insures the corporation and all defendants, it may
be reluctant to do so and lose a client. Where, however, it is only insuring the directors, it
may be more willing to seek to rescind the policies covering the culpable insiders (who
may be fired and thus will have little continuing influence over the insurer).
173. For a fuller discussion of the need and potential for greater disclosure about the
terms of D&O liability insurance, see Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the
SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance Policies, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1147-208 (2006).
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plaintiffs to grant releases to the individual defendants in return for no
financial contribution to the settlement would become much harder to
justify.' 74 In addition, such a study might well enhance the ability of the
insurer of the corporate officers to rescind its policy for fraud in the ap-
plication. Even in the case where one insurer writes all the policies, evi-
dence developed by such a study might enable the insurer to rescind the
individual officers' policies, and a properly counseled corporation would
not pick up the entire liability. Moreover, if the officers' insurance were
cancelled for fraud, plaintiffs' attorneys would have no logical reason to
accept a payment only from the defendant corporation and not pursue
the officers individually. The point is that accurate information, if devel-
oped, could change the current dynamics under which a solvent corpora-
tion bears virtually the entire cost of the settlement.
D. Attorneys'Eees
Reforms work best when they align the interests of the private actors
with the enforcement of the desired public policy. Today, the plaintiffs
attorney is the principal enforcer of securities law liabilities, and, put
bluntly, the plaintiffs attorney is indifferent as to who pays the settlement
in a securities class action. Today, the plaintiff's attorney is compensated
based on the aggregate size of the settlement, regardless of its source.
But this is easily modified. Plaintiffs' attorneys could be rewarded based
on the source of the settlement, not simply on its aggregate size. The
more that we realize that compensation is not the goal of securities litiga-
tion (and is not truly achieved in any event), the more that such a change
makes sense.
Some modest movement in this direction is already discernable.
When public pension funds offered higher fee awards for recoveries from
individual defendants, plaintiffs' attorneys responded and obtained re-
coveries from individual defendants. 75 Courts could similarly revise
their rewards. For example, the court awarding attorneys' fees in a secur-
ities class action could award substantially higher fees for the portion of
the recovery obtained from insiders or third parties than for the portion
obtained from the corporation. To illustrate, assume that plaintiffs ob-
tain a $100 million settlement that is paid 50% by the corporation and
50% by individuals and other third parties (including insiders, control-
ling shareholders, auditors, investment bankers, law firms, and others,
174. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
175. See Sue Reisinger, Investors Offer Bounties to Recover Funds, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15,
2005, at 5. Both the California State Teachers' Retirement System, the nation's third
largest public pension fund, and the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, the tenth
largest such fund, have acknowledged paying "bounties" or, alternatively, a higher
percentage fee for recoveries from individual defendants. Id. Such a bonus was not paid,
however, in the WorldCom case. Id.
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but not outside directors). 17 6 Hypothetically, the fee award on the first
50% paid by the corporation might be set at 10%, while the fee award on
the other 50% could be 30%, for an aggregate fee award of 20% (a fee
award that is not in truth above the current norm). This would reflect
both the social utility of recoveries from culpable insiders in generating
deterrence and the fact that the 50% paid by the corporation is ultimately
a cost that falls on diversified shareholders. If the plaintiffs attorney in
securities litigation is a bounty hunter, then it is time to ask courts to set
the bounties intelligently.
E. Exempting the Non-Trading Corporation as a Defendant in Rule lOb-5
Litigation
All the prior proposals in this section pale in comparison to this final
recommendation: The SEC can and should exempt the non-trading cor-
porate issuer from private liability for monetary damages under Rule
lOb-5. Effectively, this would require plaintiffs' attorneys to sue the cor-
porate insiders and the corporation's gatekeepers (e.g., its investment
bankers, auditors, and attorneys), not the issuer, in order to obtain their
recovery. At a stroke, this would eliminate entity insurance (because the
corporation now could not be sued), and it would compel the insider
defendants to apply to the corporation for indemnification when they
settled (thereby activating the board's role in monitoring indemnifica-
tion requests). Today, the board seldom has to face the issue of indemni-
fication because the corporation contributes the entire settlement and
then turns to its insurer for repayment.
But does the SEC have the authority to "disimply" Rule 10b-5-that
is, to deny a private cause of action under it? This issue has been elabo-
rately debated in the past.17 7 But whether these earlier advocates were
right or wrong is no longer the issue. Following an earlier debate over
the Commission's authority, Congress in 1996 added section 36
("General Exemptive Authority") to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,178 which authorizes the SEC to "conditionally or unconditionally
176. Of course, in principle the court would only pay such a bonus on the portion of
the individual recovery that was not indemnified or insured. At least on a transitional
basis, however, there is a case for paying a higher fee award on even an insured recovery
from individual defendants in order to encourage the transition to a fair allocation of the
recovery among the defendants.
177. Compare Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 976-99
(1994) (detailing Commission authority to disimply cause of action), with Joel Seligman,
supra note 4, at 438 (conceding authority of Commission to disimply, but doubting the
wisdom of doing so). For Professor Grundfest's response to Professor Seligman, see
Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 727 (1995).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78mm (2000). Congress granted the SEC broad exemptive power in
section 36 as part of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. See Pub. L.
No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996). The SEC first used this authority after the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 to broadly authorize corporate share repurchases
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exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of per-
sons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this
chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is con-
sistent with the protection of investors."'
79
Because Rule 10b-5 is a rule under the Exchange Act, the Commis-
sion's authority to grant an exemption from it seems clear on the face of
the statute, so long as the Commission can plausibly make the requisite
findings. If this Essay's analysis is correct, Rule lOb-5 litigation in the sec-
ondary market "stock drop" context essentially produces pocket-shifting
wealth transfers that injure shareholders and do not protect the public
interest. Predictably, some will respond that exempting the corporation
will create a haven for fraud. But this is a shallow response. 80 Because
no exemption would be given to those officers, employees, or agents who
act on the corporation's behalf or who control it, the real impact of such
an exemption would not be to end Rule 10b-5 litigation, but to focus it on
the culpable. 18' Exempting the non-trading corporation from Rule 10b-5
litigation effectively moves us at least a significant distance from a system
of enterprise liability toward a system of managerial liability.
Of course, such a change would also alter the market for D&O insur-
ance. Now threatened, executives would demand more insurance and
would reexamine the corporation's bylaws to make certain they were
guaranteed broad indemnification rights. Such insurance would fund
sufficiently large recoveries to continue to motivate plaintiffs' attorneys to
bring suit (even if the overall scale of the recoveries might decline). Be-
cause of the SEC's ban on indemnification of securities law liabilities
(when they result in judgments), 8 2 executives would remain under
strong pressure to settle and to seek indemnification. Outside directors
to stabilize the stock market. See Exemptive Relief Order, Exchange Act Release No.
44,874, [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,547, at 84,867 (Sept. 28,
2001).
179. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 36(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a) (1).
180. As a statutory matter, section 36 recognizes only one area in which the SEC
cannot grant exemptions: namely, section 15C of the Exchange Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78mm(b). Section 15C addresses government securities brokers and dealers. The fact
that Congress carved out this lone area undercuts any claim that the SEC was implicitly
denied authority to curtail its antifraud rules.
181. Managers would remain indemnified and insured, and to an extent they would
be shielded by Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
175-78, 191 (1994), which found Rule lOb-5 not to reach aiding and abetting liability. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text. But corporate officers are liable for statements that
they make to the market, and both the chief executive and the chief financial officer today
must certify the corporation's financial results under Sarbanes-Oxley, which will constitute
a statement that triggers Rule lOb-5 liability. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15
U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. 2002). Also, in Rule 10b-5 litigation, plaintiffs almost automatically
name the principal corporate executives as defendants. See supra note 52-53 and
accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
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would thus be required to consider carefully and dispassionately whether
these defendants acted "in good faith" and in a manner "reasonably be-
lieved to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation."18 3
Alternatively, insider defendants might forego indemnification and sim-
ply rely on their insurance policies, but now they would face a heightened
danger that the insurer would seek to cancel the policy for fraud in the
application. Although plaintiffs' attorneys will predictably collude with
defendants to resist any attempt to terminate the insurance policy, these
disputes are still likely to be settled on a basis that places some liability on
the individual defendant. Minimum deductibles on D&O insurance poli-
cies might also come into greater use. At this point, real deterrence
would begin to emerge.
Finally, the limited exemption from Rule 10b-5 here contemplated
would not apply when the corporation sold its shares during the class
period. In such cases, the corporation is benefiting from the fraud and
should sensibly be made a cost bearer. This position is consistent with
the SEC's own position on financial penalties.1
8 4
Some will respond that executives will not bear greater risk without
demanding higher compensation. But the contemporary evidence is that
executives already receive high rents in the form of executive compensa-
tion,'8 5 and the danger that individuals would be deterred from becom-
ing chief executive seems laughably remote.
Other variations on this proposal are possible, but they carry addi-
tional difficulties. 1 86 The key idea is that by removing the corporate de-
fendant from most Rule lOb-5 cases, we reduce the extent to which it
serves as the residual cost bearer and thereby passes the costs of the litiga-
tion onto the shareholders.
183. This is the language of Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001). See supra note
155 and accompanying text.
184. The Commission's new policy on financial penalties focuses on "whether the
issuer's violation has provided an improper benefit to shareholders." See supra notes 8-9
and accompanying text (discussing Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties).
185. For the fullest expression of this view, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse
M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
(2004). Their powerful critique of the excesses in executive compensation was written even
before the current stock option backdating scandals.
186. Another variant is that any private action against the corporate issuer would be
precluded under section 36 if the SEC brought and settled an action under Rule lOb-5 and
deposited the penalties that it collected in an account for the benefit of the plaintiff class
members. The problem with this proposal is that it may convert the SEC's Enforcement
Division into a Board of Pardons. Companies might flock to it to settle at an early stage.
Historically, the SEC has not settled its cases with a view to achieving an adequate
compensatory settlement for the injured plaintiff class members.
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CONCLUSION
To the extent that contemporary securities litigation imposes its costs
almost exclusively on the corporation and its insurers, this system benefits
three sets of actors-corporate insiders, plaintiffs' attorneys, and insur-
ance companies-but not shareholders. 18 7 Viewed in this way, the plain-
tiffs attorney is less a champion of shareholders and more a participant
in a process by which the parties shift liabilities created by corporate man-
agers onto shareholders through the medium of costly insurance paid for
by shareholders.' 8 8 Because the repeat players-managers, attorneys,
and insurers-all benefit from this system, it remains stable, and the out-
come is usually the same: settlement.
Often, the result is litigation that is, to a degree, feigned. That is, the
adversaries may vigorously skirmish and file preliminary motions, but ulti-
mately they agree to settle by imposing the costs of the litigation on the
absent party, the shareholders. The best way out of this charade is to
eliminate the nontrading corporation as a defendant (and thus remove
the fall guy). Doing this would force the true adversaries-plaintiffs' at-
torneys and individual corporate defendants-to litigate for real.
Of course, this would increase the risk that plaintiffs' attorneys as-
sumed in such litigation, and it might scale down the recoveries.' 89 Pre-
cisely for this reason, attorneys' fees should be higher with regard to that
percentage of the settlement that comes from officers and third parties in
order to incentivize the plaintiffs' bar to pursue personal liability against
such persons. Once securities litigation becomes more adversarial than it
is today, the next step would be for the SEC to recognize that the settle-
187. A similar point was made over a decade ago by Kent Syverud, who recognized
that the existing system benefited insurers, corporate managers, and plaintiffs' attorneys.
Syverud, supra note 74, at 1640-47. Everyone recognizes that a settlement in which the
corporation agrees exclusively to nonpecuniary relief but the plaintiff's attorneys receive a
high fee award (paid by the corporation) looks suspiciously like collusion. But a
settlement in which the corporation pays a significant financial recovery, while the
individual defendants contribute little or nothing, can also be fairly described as collusive
in a structural sense, even if the parties litigated intensely, because the real costs are being
borne by shareholders who have no effective voice in the settlement process. At bottom,
collusion in multiparty litigation involves pushing the costs of the action onto an absent
party or at least a party facing high agency costs in the control of its attorney.
188. Although this description will be resented by plaintiffs' attorneys, a distinctive
feature of securities litigation is that the corporation has characteristically insured itself
against liabilities imposed on it because of the conduct of its own officers. Corporations do
not insure against the risk of antitrust or environmental liabilities or virtually any other
class of legal liability (with the possible exception of employment liability). In fairness,
when plaintiffs' attorneys pursue third parties, other than the issuer corporation (as they
did in Enron and WorldCom), they are serving as the shareholders' champion.
189. Actually, the largest securities class action settlements were the Enron and
Worldcom settlements. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Neither in Enron nor
Worldcom was the issuer corporation sued in the securities class action, because it was
already in bankruptcy. These examples demonstrate that large recoveries are possible
without the issuer corporation being liable.
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ment of a securities class action represents an acute conflict of interest,
one requiring independent directors to review it as carefully as they
would a management buy out proposal.
For the SEC to take such action and curtail private Rule 10b-5 litiga-
tion, it must first acknowledge an inescapable fact: The securities class
action is unlikely to afford significant compensation to shareholders.
That realization should lead not to the abolition of the class action (as
some critics have proposed), but to its reconfiguration into a mechanism
for deterrence. Deterrence through private enforcement is possible, but
punishing the victim is both unnecessary and unjust. Thus, this Essay has
proposed some first steps in a different direction toward a system of
greater managerial liability. These steps are only marginal, but they can
be taken without legislation or any major reversal of settled precedents.
To be sure, more could be done. Congress, if motivated, could re-
strict indemnification in securities class actions; insurance practices might
also be changed to impose minimum deductibles for corporate insiders
(but not for outside directors). But such changes are unlikely in the
short run. Rather than accept the status quo as inevitable, this Essay has
proposed some marginal, but feasible, reforms. If its proposed means
seem modest, the end that they are attempting to achieve is more signifi-
cant: real deterrence, not illusory, pocket-shifting wealth transfers.
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